This paper presents a model and empirical analysis of how legal protection of minority shareholders and cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders affect corporate valuation. Using data from 371 large firms in 27 wealthy economies, the authors find that better protection of minority shareholders is associated with higher corporate valuations. They also find some evidence that higher cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders is associated with higher valuations. The study supports the importance of legal protection in limiting expropriation of minority shareholders and highlights the role of the law in shaping financial markets. The findings are consistent with the theory that better shareholder protection leads to higher corporate valuations. The paper also discusses the implications of these findings for corporate finance and financial market development.This paper presents a model and empirical analysis of how legal protection of minority shareholders and cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders affect corporate valuation. Using data from 371 large firms in 27 wealthy economies, the authors find that better protection of minority shareholders is associated with higher corporate valuations. They also find some evidence that higher cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders is associated with higher valuations. The study supports the importance of legal protection in limiting expropriation of minority shareholders and highlights the role of the law in shaping financial markets. The findings are consistent with the theory that better shareholder protection leads to higher corporate valuations. The paper also discusses the implications of these findings for corporate finance and financial market development.