The paper "Is the JCJ voting system really coercion-resistant?" by Véronique Cortier, Pierrick Gaudry, and Quentin Yang, published in the 37th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) in 2024, addresses the security property of coercion-resistance in electronic voting systems. The JCJ voting scheme, proposed by Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson in 2005, is a reference paradigm for designing coercion-resistant protocols. However, the authors identify a weakness in the JCJ scheme that is also present in all systems following its general structure. This weakness lies in the procedure that precedes the tally, where trustees remove ballots that should not be counted, leaking more information than necessary, which can lead to potential threats for coerced voters. To address this issue, the authors propose a variant of the JCJ scheme called CHide, which introduces a cleansing-hiding procedure. This modification ensures that only minimal information is leaked, specifically the number of ballots removed. The authors also propose a new definition of coercion-resistance that accounts for revoting and the addition of fake ballots by authorities, proving that CHide is coercion-resistant under this definition while JCJ is not. The paper provides a detailed analysis of the JCJ scheme, including its vulnerabilities and the proposed solutions. It also discusses the impact of revoting on coercion-resistance, demonstrating that JCJ's leakage can be exploited in realistic scenarios to break coercion-resistance. The authors conclude by showing that CHide provides full coercion-resistance and is more efficient in terms of computational and communication costs compared to the original JCJ scheme.The paper "Is the JCJ voting system really coercion-resistant?" by Véronique Cortier, Pierrick Gaudry, and Quentin Yang, published in the 37th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) in 2024, addresses the security property of coercion-resistance in electronic voting systems. The JCJ voting scheme, proposed by Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson in 2005, is a reference paradigm for designing coercion-resistant protocols. However, the authors identify a weakness in the JCJ scheme that is also present in all systems following its general structure. This weakness lies in the procedure that precedes the tally, where trustees remove ballots that should not be counted, leaking more information than necessary, which can lead to potential threats for coerced voters. To address this issue, the authors propose a variant of the JCJ scheme called CHide, which introduces a cleansing-hiding procedure. This modification ensures that only minimal information is leaked, specifically the number of ballots removed. The authors also propose a new definition of coercion-resistance that accounts for revoting and the addition of fake ballots by authorities, proving that CHide is coercion-resistant under this definition while JCJ is not. The paper provides a detailed analysis of the JCJ scheme, including its vulnerabilities and the proposed solutions. It also discusses the impact of revoting on coercion-resistance, demonstrating that JCJ's leakage can be exploited in realistic scenarios to break coercion-resistance. The authors conclude by showing that CHide provides full coercion-resistance and is more efficient in terms of computational and communication costs compared to the original JCJ scheme.