In his review of Rudolf Carnap's work, Gilbert Ryle critiques Carnap's theories on meaning and logical necessity. Ryle argues that Carnap's approach, while an improvement over Frege's, still suffers from significant flaws. He criticizes Carnap's use of the term "designator" to describe expressions, which is essentially equivalent to Frege's "term" and fails to address the fundamental issues with the traditional doctrine of terms. Ryle points out that Carnap's theories, despite their technical sophistication, are philosophically naive and based on outdated concepts like extension and intension. He emphasizes that Carnap's treatment of sentences as having both intensions and extensions is problematic, as it fails to capture the true nature of linguistic usage. Ryle also highlights the absurdity of treating sentences as having entities as their intensions, which is a common error in Fregean and Meinongian theories. Overall, Ryle concludes that Carnap's work, while influential, may hinder the progress of semantic problems in philosophy and logic due to its inherent philosophical naivety.In his review of Rudolf Carnap's work, Gilbert Ryle critiques Carnap's theories on meaning and logical necessity. Ryle argues that Carnap's approach, while an improvement over Frege's, still suffers from significant flaws. He criticizes Carnap's use of the term "designator" to describe expressions, which is essentially equivalent to Frege's "term" and fails to address the fundamental issues with the traditional doctrine of terms. Ryle points out that Carnap's theories, despite their technical sophistication, are philosophically naive and based on outdated concepts like extension and intension. He emphasizes that Carnap's treatment of sentences as having both intensions and extensions is problematic, as it fails to capture the true nature of linguistic usage. Ryle also highlights the absurdity of treating sentences as having entities as their intensions, which is a common error in Fregean and Meinongian theories. Overall, Ryle concludes that Carnap's work, while influential, may hinder the progress of semantic problems in philosophy and logic due to its inherent philosophical naivety.