The article "Metacognitive Feelings: A Predictive-Processing Perspective" by Pablo Fernández Velasco and Slawa Loev explores the nature and emergence of metacognitive feelings, such as the feeling of knowing (FoK) and the feeling of confidence (FoC). Metacognitive feelings are affective experiences that concern the subject's mental processes and capacities. The authors propose a predictive-processing (PP) framework to explain these feelings, which posits that the brain is a hierarchical hypothesis-testing mechanism that predicts sensory input based on prior experience and updates predictions based on prediction errors. According to the PP framework, metacognitive feelings arise from visceral changes serving as cues to predict the error dynamics related to specific mental processes. The expected rate of prediction-error reduction corresponds to the valence of the emerging metacognitive feeling. These feelings use prediction dynamics to model the agent's situation, both descriptively and directive, influencing mental and bodily actions. The article reviews existing models of metacognitive feelings, including direct-access models and heuristic-based views, and discusses the role of embodiment in these heuristics. It also explores computational models of confidence and decision-making, highlighting the tension between feed-forward and hierarchical models. The PP framework is introduced, emphasizing its unifying potential and its ability to account for both feelings and mental action. The authors argue that metacognitive feelings are conscious affective experiences with valence, influenced by interoceptive changes and prediction error dynamics. They propose that metacognitive feelings emerge from the predicted dynamics of prediction errors, forming a holistic, dynamic model that is both descriptive and directive. This model biases the competition between different cognitive affordances, influencing the probability of occurrence of various mental actions. In conclusion, the article provides a comprehensive account of metacognitive feelings within the PP framework, explaining their emergence, function, and impact on mental and bodily actions.The article "Metacognitive Feelings: A Predictive-Processing Perspective" by Pablo Fernández Velasco and Slawa Loev explores the nature and emergence of metacognitive feelings, such as the feeling of knowing (FoK) and the feeling of confidence (FoC). Metacognitive feelings are affective experiences that concern the subject's mental processes and capacities. The authors propose a predictive-processing (PP) framework to explain these feelings, which posits that the brain is a hierarchical hypothesis-testing mechanism that predicts sensory input based on prior experience and updates predictions based on prediction errors. According to the PP framework, metacognitive feelings arise from visceral changes serving as cues to predict the error dynamics related to specific mental processes. The expected rate of prediction-error reduction corresponds to the valence of the emerging metacognitive feeling. These feelings use prediction dynamics to model the agent's situation, both descriptively and directive, influencing mental and bodily actions. The article reviews existing models of metacognitive feelings, including direct-access models and heuristic-based views, and discusses the role of embodiment in these heuristics. It also explores computational models of confidence and decision-making, highlighting the tension between feed-forward and hierarchical models. The PP framework is introduced, emphasizing its unifying potential and its ability to account for both feelings and mental action. The authors argue that metacognitive feelings are conscious affective experiences with valence, influenced by interoceptive changes and prediction error dynamics. They propose that metacognitive feelings emerge from the predicted dynamics of prediction errors, forming a holistic, dynamic model that is both descriptive and directive. This model biases the competition between different cognitive affordances, influencing the probability of occurrence of various mental actions. In conclusion, the article provides a comprehensive account of metacognitive feelings within the PP framework, explaining their emergence, function, and impact on mental and bodily actions.