This paper by Thomas C. Schelling explores how segregation can arise from individual choices, even when there is no explicit discrimination. Schelling argues that segregation by color in the United States is not necessarily due to intentional discrimination but can result from the interplay of individual preferences and choices. He uses a model to show that even small preferences for living among people of the same race can lead to complete segregation. Schelling presents a model where individuals have a preference for living in neighborhoods with a certain proportion of their own race. If this preference is strong enough, it can lead to segregation. He illustrates this with a simple example of a line of people, where each person prefers to live in a neighborhood with a 50-50 mix of races. However, if people define their neighborhood as their own house and the neighbors on either side, they may end up in segregated neighborhoods. Schelling also discusses how segregation can occur even when people do not mind each other's presence. If there is a limit to how small a minority either race is willing to be, initial mixtures more extreme than that will lose their minority members and become all of one color. This can lead to complete segregation as the minority group leaves. Schelling also presents a model where people have different tolerances for the ratio of opposite colors in their neighborhood. If the tolerance limits are high enough, people can coexist in mixed neighborhoods. However, if the tolerance limits are low, segregation is more likely. The paper concludes that segregation can arise from individual choices and preferences, even in the absence of explicit discrimination. The model shows that even small preferences can lead to segregation, and that the dynamics of entry and exit can prevent mixed neighborhoods from stabilizing. The paper also highlights that the results do not depend on each color's preference for the absence of the other, and that the model can fit both interpretations of tolerance and preference.This paper by Thomas C. Schelling explores how segregation can arise from individual choices, even when there is no explicit discrimination. Schelling argues that segregation by color in the United States is not necessarily due to intentional discrimination but can result from the interplay of individual preferences and choices. He uses a model to show that even small preferences for living among people of the same race can lead to complete segregation. Schelling presents a model where individuals have a preference for living in neighborhoods with a certain proportion of their own race. If this preference is strong enough, it can lead to segregation. He illustrates this with a simple example of a line of people, where each person prefers to live in a neighborhood with a 50-50 mix of races. However, if people define their neighborhood as their own house and the neighbors on either side, they may end up in segregated neighborhoods. Schelling also discusses how segregation can occur even when people do not mind each other's presence. If there is a limit to how small a minority either race is willing to be, initial mixtures more extreme than that will lose their minority members and become all of one color. This can lead to complete segregation as the minority group leaves. Schelling also presents a model where people have different tolerances for the ratio of opposite colors in their neighborhood. If the tolerance limits are high enough, people can coexist in mixed neighborhoods. However, if the tolerance limits are low, segregation is more likely. The paper concludes that segregation can arise from individual choices and preferences, even in the absence of explicit discrimination. The model shows that even small preferences can lead to segregation, and that the dynamics of entry and exit can prevent mixed neighborhoods from stabilizing. The paper also highlights that the results do not depend on each color's preference for the absence of the other, and that the model can fit both interpretations of tolerance and preference.