Models of Ecological Rationality: The Recognition Heuristic

Models of Ecological Rationality: The Recognition Heuristic

2002, Vol. 109, No. 1, 75-90 | Daniel G. Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer
The article by Daniel G. Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer explores the recognition heuristic, a simple and adaptive strategy that relies on the human capacity for recognition to make inferences. The authors argue that heuristics are not merely imperfect versions of optimal statistical procedures but are fundamental psychological mechanisms that evolved alongside other cognitive processes. The recognition heuristic is particularly useful when there is a strong correlation between recognition and the criterion being predicted. The authors define the recognition heuristic as follows: if one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized object has the higher value with respect to the criterion. They demonstrate that this heuristic can lead to counterintuitive results, such as situations where less knowledge is better than more for making accurate inferences, known as the "less-is-more effect." The article includes mathematical analysis, computer simulations, and experiments to support these findings. The authors also discuss the ecological rationality of the recognition heuristic, its domain specificity, and its robustness in both theoretical and real-world settings. Finally, they test whether people actually use the recognition heuristic in their inferences, finding that it captures the majority of human judgments.The article by Daniel G. Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer explores the recognition heuristic, a simple and adaptive strategy that relies on the human capacity for recognition to make inferences. The authors argue that heuristics are not merely imperfect versions of optimal statistical procedures but are fundamental psychological mechanisms that evolved alongside other cognitive processes. The recognition heuristic is particularly useful when there is a strong correlation between recognition and the criterion being predicted. The authors define the recognition heuristic as follows: if one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized object has the higher value with respect to the criterion. They demonstrate that this heuristic can lead to counterintuitive results, such as situations where less knowledge is better than more for making accurate inferences, known as the "less-is-more effect." The article includes mathematical analysis, computer simulations, and experiments to support these findings. The authors also discuss the ecological rationality of the recognition heuristic, its domain specificity, and its robustness in both theoretical and real-world settings. Finally, they test whether people actually use the recognition heuristic in their inferences, finding that it captures the majority of human judgments.
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