The paper by G. E. M. Anscombe discusses the state of modern moral philosophy and its relationship with the philosophy of psychology. She argues that moral philosophy is not currently productive and that concepts like moral obligation, duty, and the moral sense of "ought" should be abandoned, as they are remnants of an outdated ethical framework. She also notes that the differences between modern English moral philosophers are not significant. Anscombe contrasts modern moral philosophy with Aristotle's ethics, pointing out that modern concepts like "moral" are not present in Aristotle's work. She critiques several modern philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill, for their shortcomings in understanding moral concepts. She argues that the concept of "pleasure" is problematic and that modern philosophers have not adequately addressed it. Anscombe discusses the transition from "is" to "ought" and the role of "ought" in moral philosophy. She argues that "ought" is not a moral term in the sense of a moral obligation but rather a psychological term. She also discusses the concept of "moral obligation" and its relationship to divine law, arguing that it is a concept that has been influenced by religious ideas. Anscombe concludes that modern moral philosophy is not as significant as it appears and that the differences between philosophers are not as important as they seem. She argues that the concept of "moral obligation" is not as clear as it appears and that the philosophy of psychology is needed to understand moral concepts. She also argues that the term "morally wrong" is not as meaningful as it appears and that the concept of "unjust" is more appropriate. Anscombe concludes that the term "ought" should be used in a non-emphatic sense and that the term "wrong" should be replaced with "unjust."The paper by G. E. M. Anscombe discusses the state of modern moral philosophy and its relationship with the philosophy of psychology. She argues that moral philosophy is not currently productive and that concepts like moral obligation, duty, and the moral sense of "ought" should be abandoned, as they are remnants of an outdated ethical framework. She also notes that the differences between modern English moral philosophers are not significant. Anscombe contrasts modern moral philosophy with Aristotle's ethics, pointing out that modern concepts like "moral" are not present in Aristotle's work. She critiques several modern philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill, for their shortcomings in understanding moral concepts. She argues that the concept of "pleasure" is problematic and that modern philosophers have not adequately addressed it. Anscombe discusses the transition from "is" to "ought" and the role of "ought" in moral philosophy. She argues that "ought" is not a moral term in the sense of a moral obligation but rather a psychological term. She also discusses the concept of "moral obligation" and its relationship to divine law, arguing that it is a concept that has been influenced by religious ideas. Anscombe concludes that modern moral philosophy is not as significant as it appears and that the differences between philosophers are not as important as they seem. She argues that the concept of "moral obligation" is not as clear as it appears and that the philosophy of psychology is needed to understand moral concepts. She also argues that the term "morally wrong" is not as meaningful as it appears and that the concept of "unjust" is more appropriate. Anscombe concludes that the term "ought" should be used in a non-emphatic sense and that the term "wrong" should be replaced with "unjust."