G. E. M. Anscombe begins her paper by presenting three theses: first, that moral philosophy is not profitable at present due to the lack of an adequate philosophy of psychology; second, that concepts of obligation, duty, and moral right and wrong should be abandoned if psychologically possible; and third, that differences between prominent English moral philosophers from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. She argues that modern moral philosophy, as exemplified by writers like Butler, Hume, Kant, and Mill, is flawed and fails to provide a coherent framework for understanding moral concepts. Anscombe critiques these philosophers for their reliance on outdated ethical conceptions and their failure to address the psychological underpinnings of morality. She emphasizes the need for a more fundamental understanding of human action, intention, and pleasure, suggesting that these concepts are crucial for a meaningful ethical discourse. Anscombe also discusses the transition from "is" to "ought" and the concept of "obligation," arguing that these terms have lost their original meaning and are best discarded. She concludes by advocating for a return to Aristotelian ethics, which she believes provides a more robust foundation for moral philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe begins her paper by presenting three theses: first, that moral philosophy is not profitable at present due to the lack of an adequate philosophy of psychology; second, that concepts of obligation, duty, and moral right and wrong should be abandoned if psychologically possible; and third, that differences between prominent English moral philosophers from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. She argues that modern moral philosophy, as exemplified by writers like Butler, Hume, Kant, and Mill, is flawed and fails to provide a coherent framework for understanding moral concepts. Anscombe critiques these philosophers for their reliance on outdated ethical conceptions and their failure to address the psychological underpinnings of morality. She emphasizes the need for a more fundamental understanding of human action, intention, and pleasure, suggesting that these concepts are crucial for a meaningful ethical discourse. Anscombe also discusses the transition from "is" to "ought" and the concept of "obligation," arguing that these terms have lost their original meaning and are best discarded. She concludes by advocating for a return to Aristotelian ethics, which she believes provides a more robust foundation for moral philosophy.