Motivational control of goal-directed action

Motivational control of goal-directed action

1994, 22 (1), 1-18 | ANTHONY DICKINSON and BERNARD BALLEINE
The paper by Anthony Dickinson and Bernard Balleine explores the control of goal-directed actions by primary motivational states such as hunger and thirst. They identify two processes: a Pavlovian process mediated by contextual or discriminative stimuli and an instrumental process mediated by knowledge of the contingency between the action and its outcome. The authors argue that motivational states do not directly influence the instrumental process but rather control the value assigned to outcomes through incentive learning. They discuss the concept of goal-directed action, distinguishing it from Pavlovian conditioning, and present criteria for evaluating whether an action is goal-directed. The paper also examines Tolman's theory of "cathexes," which posits that motivational states determine the agent's representation of an outcome as a goal. Through various experiments, the authors demonstrate that animals must learn about the value of outcomes in specific motivational states, rather than having it assigned directly. They conclude that primary motivational states have no direct impact on the current value assigned to outcomes; instead, agents must learn about the value through direct experience, a process they term incentive learning. This learning must occur before the motivational state can influence the value of outcomes, and it is distinct from the learning processes that control instrumental performance once the value is acquired.The paper by Anthony Dickinson and Bernard Balleine explores the control of goal-directed actions by primary motivational states such as hunger and thirst. They identify two processes: a Pavlovian process mediated by contextual or discriminative stimuli and an instrumental process mediated by knowledge of the contingency between the action and its outcome. The authors argue that motivational states do not directly influence the instrumental process but rather control the value assigned to outcomes through incentive learning. They discuss the concept of goal-directed action, distinguishing it from Pavlovian conditioning, and present criteria for evaluating whether an action is goal-directed. The paper also examines Tolman's theory of "cathexes," which posits that motivational states determine the agent's representation of an outcome as a goal. Through various experiments, the authors demonstrate that animals must learn about the value of outcomes in specific motivational states, rather than having it assigned directly. They conclude that primary motivational states have no direct impact on the current value assigned to outcomes; instead, agents must learn about the value through direct experience, a process they term incentive learning. This learning must occur before the motivational state can influence the value of outcomes, and it is distinct from the learning processes that control instrumental performance once the value is acquired.
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