The paper "Non-Atomic Arbitrage in Decentralized Finance" by Lioba Heimbach, Vabuk Pahari, and Eric Schertenleib explores the prevalence and impact of non-atomic arbitrage on decentralized exchanges (DEXes) on the Ethereum blockchain. Non-atomic arbitrage involves exploiting price differences between DEXes on Ethereum and other exchanges, both on-chain and off-chain. The authors find that over a fourth of the volume on Ethereum's top five DEXes from the merge until October 31, 2023, can be attributed to this type of arbitrage. They identify eleven searchers responsible for more than 80% of the identified non-atomic arbitrage volume, totaling $132 billion. The paper highlights the centralization of the block construction market and its implications for security, particularly given the high-value transactions that account for more than 10% of Ethereum's total block value. The authors also discuss possible mitigations for these security concerns. The study uses a combination of Ethereum blockchain data, PBS relay data, Ethereum network data, and cryptocurrency price data to analyze the phenomenon. They develop a model to quantify the profits from non-atomic arbitrageurs and provide a detailed case study of a block with significant price changes, illustrating how non-atomic arbitrage trades are executed. The paper concludes by analyzing the drivers of non-atomic arbitrage, including the correlation between price volatility and arbitrage volume, and the role of integrated searchers who operate both as searchers and builders.The paper "Non-Atomic Arbitrage in Decentralized Finance" by Lioba Heimbach, Vabuk Pahari, and Eric Schertenleib explores the prevalence and impact of non-atomic arbitrage on decentralized exchanges (DEXes) on the Ethereum blockchain. Non-atomic arbitrage involves exploiting price differences between DEXes on Ethereum and other exchanges, both on-chain and off-chain. The authors find that over a fourth of the volume on Ethereum's top five DEXes from the merge until October 31, 2023, can be attributed to this type of arbitrage. They identify eleven searchers responsible for more than 80% of the identified non-atomic arbitrage volume, totaling $132 billion. The paper highlights the centralization of the block construction market and its implications for security, particularly given the high-value transactions that account for more than 10% of Ethereum's total block value. The authors also discuss possible mitigations for these security concerns. The study uses a combination of Ethereum blockchain data, PBS relay data, Ethereum network data, and cryptocurrency price data to analyze the phenomenon. They develop a model to quantify the profits from non-atomic arbitrageurs and provide a detailed case study of a block with significant price changes, illustrating how non-atomic arbitrage trades are executed. The paper concludes by analyzing the drivers of non-atomic arbitrage, including the correlation between price volatility and arbitrage volume, and the role of integrated searchers who operate both as searchers and builders.