The paper "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria" by Elon Kohlberg and Jean-François Mertens explores the concept of strategic stability in noncooperative games. The authors address the question of which Nash equilibria are self-enforcing and whether every game has a strategically stable equilibrium. They propose three necessary conditions for strategic stability: backwards induction, iterated dominance, and invariance. These conditions are formalized into a set-valued equilibrium concept, which is shown to exist for every game. The paper also discusses the limitations of existing equilibrium concepts, such as perfect and sequential equilibria, which fail to satisfy these conditions or are not robust to irrelevant details in the game description. The authors argue that a good concept of strategic stability should combine the rationality of backwards induction and the iterated dominance rationality, while being independent of irrelevant details. They provide a formal development of their set-valued equilibrium concept and prove that it satisfies all the required conditions. The paper concludes with a discussion on the equivalence of equilibria and the main requirements for strategic stability.The paper "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria" by Elon Kohlberg and Jean-François Mertens explores the concept of strategic stability in noncooperative games. The authors address the question of which Nash equilibria are self-enforcing and whether every game has a strategically stable equilibrium. They propose three necessary conditions for strategic stability: backwards induction, iterated dominance, and invariance. These conditions are formalized into a set-valued equilibrium concept, which is shown to exist for every game. The paper also discusses the limitations of existing equilibrium concepts, such as perfect and sequential equilibria, which fail to satisfy these conditions or are not robust to irrelevant details in the game description. The authors argue that a good concept of strategic stability should combine the rationality of backwards induction and the iterated dominance rationality, while being independent of irrelevant details. They provide a formal development of their set-valued equilibrium concept and prove that it satisfies all the required conditions. The paper concludes with a discussion on the equivalence of equilibria and the main requirements for strategic stability.