This paper presents a theoretical model for breaking cryptographic schemes by exploiting random hardware faults. The authors demonstrate how hardware faults can be used to attack RSA and Rabin signature schemes, as well as authentication protocols like Fiat-Shamir and Schnorr. The attack works by inducing faults in the computation process, which allow an adversary to extract secret information from the system. The paper introduces a fault model where hardware faults are transient, affecting only the current data and not subsequent data. The authors show that even a single faulty signature can be used to factor the RSA modulus, which breaks the system. They also demonstrate that hardware faults can be used to break other implementations of RSA, though more faults are required. The paper discusses various types of hardware faults, including transient, latent, and induced faults. It emphasizes the importance of verifying computations and protecting internal memory with error detection mechanisms, such as CRC, to prevent attacks based on hardware faults. The authors analyze the vulnerability of RSA implementations that use the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), showing that a single faulty signature can be used to factor the modulus. They also show how hardware faults can be used to break the Fiat-Shamir and Schnorr identification schemes, which are commonly used in smart cards. The paper concludes that hardware faults pose a significant threat to cryptographic protocols and that verifying computations and protecting internal memory are essential for security. The authors suggest that error detection bits and program checking methods can help defend against such attacks. They also highlight the importance of further research into improving fault-based attacks and developing more secure cryptographic protocols.This paper presents a theoretical model for breaking cryptographic schemes by exploiting random hardware faults. The authors demonstrate how hardware faults can be used to attack RSA and Rabin signature schemes, as well as authentication protocols like Fiat-Shamir and Schnorr. The attack works by inducing faults in the computation process, which allow an adversary to extract secret information from the system. The paper introduces a fault model where hardware faults are transient, affecting only the current data and not subsequent data. The authors show that even a single faulty signature can be used to factor the RSA modulus, which breaks the system. They also demonstrate that hardware faults can be used to break other implementations of RSA, though more faults are required. The paper discusses various types of hardware faults, including transient, latent, and induced faults. It emphasizes the importance of verifying computations and protecting internal memory with error detection mechanisms, such as CRC, to prevent attacks based on hardware faults. The authors analyze the vulnerability of RSA implementations that use the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), showing that a single faulty signature can be used to factor the modulus. They also show how hardware faults can be used to break the Fiat-Shamir and Schnorr identification schemes, which are commonly used in smart cards. The paper concludes that hardware faults pose a significant threat to cryptographic protocols and that verifying computations and protecting internal memory are essential for security. The authors suggest that error detection bits and program checking methods can help defend against such attacks. They also highlight the importance of further research into improving fault-based attacks and developing more secure cryptographic protocols.