John A. List examines the dictator game, a key tool in experimental economics, to explore the interpretation of giving behavior. He collects data from nearly 200 dictators across treatments that vary the action set and the origin of endowments. The study challenges the traditional view that dictators typically give a significant portion of their endowment. Instead, it finds that when the action set includes the option to take money from the other player, fewer agents are willing to give. However, agents do not universally choose the most selfish outcome, suggesting that social preferences play a role. List argues that the traditional interpretation of dictator game data may be flawed. The results suggest that "institutions" significantly influence behavior, not just through permissible actions but also through the structure of the action set. The study highlights that the distribution of offers shifts depending on whether negative or positive actions are allowed. This implies that the context of the game affects how people behave, and that the traditional action set may invoke expectations of generosity that are not always present. The study also shows that when the action set is symmetric, giving behavior diminishes significantly. This suggests that the moral cost of taking or giving is context-dependent. The findings support the idea that social norms and situational cues influence behavior in dictator games. The results challenge existing models of social preferences and suggest that future research should consider the role of context and institutions in shaping behavior. List's study provides empirical evidence that the traditional interpretation of dictator game data may need revision. The results suggest that the choice set can significantly influence behavior, and that the moral cost of selfish actions varies depending on the context. The study also highlights the importance of considering the broader context of the experiment when interpreting results, as laboratory settings may not fully capture real-world behavior. Overall, the study underscores the complexity of human behavior in economic contexts and the need for more nuanced theoretical frameworks to understand it.John A. List examines the dictator game, a key tool in experimental economics, to explore the interpretation of giving behavior. He collects data from nearly 200 dictators across treatments that vary the action set and the origin of endowments. The study challenges the traditional view that dictators typically give a significant portion of their endowment. Instead, it finds that when the action set includes the option to take money from the other player, fewer agents are willing to give. However, agents do not universally choose the most selfish outcome, suggesting that social preferences play a role. List argues that the traditional interpretation of dictator game data may be flawed. The results suggest that "institutions" significantly influence behavior, not just through permissible actions but also through the structure of the action set. The study highlights that the distribution of offers shifts depending on whether negative or positive actions are allowed. This implies that the context of the game affects how people behave, and that the traditional action set may invoke expectations of generosity that are not always present. The study also shows that when the action set is symmetric, giving behavior diminishes significantly. This suggests that the moral cost of taking or giving is context-dependent. The findings support the idea that social norms and situational cues influence behavior in dictator games. The results challenge existing models of social preferences and suggest that future research should consider the role of context and institutions in shaping behavior. List's study provides empirical evidence that the traditional interpretation of dictator game data may need revision. The results suggest that the choice set can significantly influence behavior, and that the moral cost of selfish actions varies depending on the context. The study also highlights the importance of considering the broader context of the experiment when interpreting results, as laboratory settings may not fully capture real-world behavior. Overall, the study underscores the complexity of human behavior in economic contexts and the need for more nuanced theoretical frameworks to understand it.