This paper examines the relationship between economic openness and inflation, testing a theoretical prediction that models of inefficiently high inflation due to the absence of precommitment in monetary policy predict a negative correlation between openness and inflation. The author uses cross-country data to test this prediction, finding a strong and robust negative link between openness and inflation. The results suggest that in more open economies, the incentives to expand are lower, leading to lower equilibrium inflation. The paper also investigates the robustness of these findings by including measures of political stability and central bank independence, which are important determinants of inflation. The results show that the openness-inflation relationship is weaker in countries with more stable political environments and more independent central banks, supporting the theoretical argument. Additionally, the relationship holds across various types of countries, except for highly developed countries, which have low inflation rates and are not influenced by the dynamic inconsistency problem. The paper concludes by discussing alternative explanations for the openness-inflation relationship and finding them inconsistent with the data.This paper examines the relationship between economic openness and inflation, testing a theoretical prediction that models of inefficiently high inflation due to the absence of precommitment in monetary policy predict a negative correlation between openness and inflation. The author uses cross-country data to test this prediction, finding a strong and robust negative link between openness and inflation. The results suggest that in more open economies, the incentives to expand are lower, leading to lower equilibrium inflation. The paper also investigates the robustness of these findings by including measures of political stability and central bank independence, which are important determinants of inflation. The results show that the openness-inflation relationship is weaker in countries with more stable political environments and more independent central banks, supporting the theoretical argument. Additionally, the relationship holds across various types of countries, except for highly developed countries, which have low inflation rates and are not influenced by the dynamic inconsistency problem. The paper concludes by discussing alternative explanations for the openness-inflation relationship and finding them inconsistent with the data.