Lakoff and Johnson (1999) present *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* as a continuation of their earlier work, *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), which is considered a classic in cognitive linguistics. In this book, they challenge the foundations of Western philosophy by emphasizing the role of embodied experience in shaping thought. They argue that the mind is not a separate, metaphysical entity but is "embodied," structured through our physical experiences. This challenges Cartesian dualism by showing that reason is also embodied, emerging from the brain and the body's interaction with the world. The authors propose that almost all thinking is unconscious, as we are not aware of the mechanisms that allow us to understand language. Consciousness, they argue, arises from a vast, unconscious system that enables us to process information. Furthermore, they assert that abstract concepts are largely metaphorical, a cognitive tool that shapes how we think, see, and act. Examples like "discussion is war" and "time is money" illustrate this point. In *Philosophy in the Flesh*, the authors explore metaphors that underpin key Western philosophical concepts such as "self," "time," "causality," and "moral." These concepts are not rational or transcendent but are rooted in bodily experiences. The book is organized into four parts, challenging Western philosophy by integrating cognitive science into philosophical inquiry. It advocates for an embodied philosophy that redefines the relationship between mind, body, and thought.Lakoff and Johnson (1999) present *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* as a continuation of their earlier work, *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), which is considered a classic in cognitive linguistics. In this book, they challenge the foundations of Western philosophy by emphasizing the role of embodied experience in shaping thought. They argue that the mind is not a separate, metaphysical entity but is "embodied," structured through our physical experiences. This challenges Cartesian dualism by showing that reason is also embodied, emerging from the brain and the body's interaction with the world. The authors propose that almost all thinking is unconscious, as we are not aware of the mechanisms that allow us to understand language. Consciousness, they argue, arises from a vast, unconscious system that enables us to process information. Furthermore, they assert that abstract concepts are largely metaphorical, a cognitive tool that shapes how we think, see, and act. Examples like "discussion is war" and "time is money" illustrate this point. In *Philosophy in the Flesh*, the authors explore metaphors that underpin key Western philosophical concepts such as "self," "time," "causality," and "moral." These concepts are not rational or transcendent but are rooted in bodily experiences. The book is organized into four parts, challenging Western philosophy by integrating cognitive science into philosophical inquiry. It advocates for an embodied philosophy that redefines the relationship between mind, body, and thought.