In "Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought," George Lakoff and Mark Johnson build upon their earlier work, "Metaphors We Live By" (1980), which is considered a seminal text in cognitive linguistics. The authors argue that the mind is not a purely metaphysical entity but is deeply structured by our physical experiences. They challenge the Cartesian dualism between body and mind, suggesting that both are "corporified" and influenced by our brain and body's interactions with the world. Secondly, they propose that most thought processes are unconscious, as we lack direct access to the mechanisms that enable us to understand statements or perform linguistic tasks. Consciousness, they argue, operates through an extensive, unconscious, and inaccessible system that supports its own functioning. The book also revisits the central thesis of "Metaphors We Live By," which posits that abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. Unlike the traditional view that metaphors are mere ornamental elements, Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphors are fundamental cognitive tools that shape how we think, speak, and act. They explore how concepts like "self," "time," "causality," and "moralitas" are metaphorically grounded in our bodily experiences. The book is structured into four parts: the embodied mind challenging Western philosophy, cognitive science of basic philosophical ideas, cognitive science of philosophy, and embodied philosophy. This structure clearly outlines the authors' goal of questioning the foundations of Western philosophy through the lens of embodied cognition.In "Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought," George Lakoff and Mark Johnson build upon their earlier work, "Metaphors We Live By" (1980), which is considered a seminal text in cognitive linguistics. The authors argue that the mind is not a purely metaphysical entity but is deeply structured by our physical experiences. They challenge the Cartesian dualism between body and mind, suggesting that both are "corporified" and influenced by our brain and body's interactions with the world. Secondly, they propose that most thought processes are unconscious, as we lack direct access to the mechanisms that enable us to understand statements or perform linguistic tasks. Consciousness, they argue, operates through an extensive, unconscious, and inaccessible system that supports its own functioning. The book also revisits the central thesis of "Metaphors We Live By," which posits that abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. Unlike the traditional view that metaphors are mere ornamental elements, Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphors are fundamental cognitive tools that shape how we think, speak, and act. They explore how concepts like "self," "time," "causality," and "moralitas" are metaphorically grounded in our bodily experiences. The book is structured into four parts: the embodied mind challenging Western philosophy, cognitive science of basic philosophical ideas, cognitive science of philosophy, and embodied philosophy. This structure clearly outlines the authors' goal of questioning the foundations of Western philosophy through the lens of embodied cognition.