This paper revisits politeness research influenced by Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory. The authors argue that this research tradition focuses on mitigating face-threatening acts (FTAs) rather than on politeness itself. Politeness is viewed as a discursive concept, not a fixed trait, and thus cannot be predicted by analysts. Instead, researchers should focus on the discursive struggle between interactants. This reduces politeness to a smaller part of facework and allows for interpretations where behavior is merely appropriate, neither polite nor impolite. The authors propose that relational work, the "work" individuals invest in negotiating relationships, is a useful concept for investigating the discursive struggle over politeness. They demonstrate this through close readings of five examples from naturally occurring interactions. Keywords: politeness; impoliteness; face; relational work; facework The paper argues that Brown and Levinson's Politeness Theory is not a theory of politeness but rather a theory of facework, focusing on mitigating FTAs. It does not account for situations where face-threat mitigation is not a priority, such as aggressive or rude behavior. However, Brown and Levinson's framework can still be used if we look at the strategies they propose for relational work. The authors propose that politeness is only a relatively small part of relational work and must be seen in relation to other types of interpersonal meaning. They define relational work as the "work" individuals invest in negotiating relationships with others, encompassing both appropriate and inappropriate behavior. They argue that relational work includes both polite and impolite behavior and is equivalent to Halliday's interpersonal level of communication. The paper discusses the concept of face, derived from Goffman, and how it is socially attributed in each interaction. It argues that relational work comprises a more comprehensive notion of face than Brown and Levinson's theory. However, it also leads to a more restricted view of politeness. The authors argue that politeness is a discursive concept, not inherently defined, and that participants' perceptions of behavior are set against individual normative expectations of appropriate or politic behavior. They argue that no utterance is inherently polite, and that politeness is discursively negotiated. The paper presents five examples of naturally occurring interactions to demonstrate how relational work operates. These examples show that behavior can be appropriate, polite, or impolite, and that participants' perceptions of behavior are influenced by their own normative expectations. The authors argue that relational work is a useful concept for understanding the discursive struggle over politeness and that it encompasses a broader range of behaviors than traditional theories of politeness. They conclude that politeness is a discursive concept, not inherently defined, and that the study of relational work is a fascinating field of research that merits attention.This paper revisits politeness research influenced by Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory. The authors argue that this research tradition focuses on mitigating face-threatening acts (FTAs) rather than on politeness itself. Politeness is viewed as a discursive concept, not a fixed trait, and thus cannot be predicted by analysts. Instead, researchers should focus on the discursive struggle between interactants. This reduces politeness to a smaller part of facework and allows for interpretations where behavior is merely appropriate, neither polite nor impolite. The authors propose that relational work, the "work" individuals invest in negotiating relationships, is a useful concept for investigating the discursive struggle over politeness. They demonstrate this through close readings of five examples from naturally occurring interactions. Keywords: politeness; impoliteness; face; relational work; facework The paper argues that Brown and Levinson's Politeness Theory is not a theory of politeness but rather a theory of facework, focusing on mitigating FTAs. It does not account for situations where face-threat mitigation is not a priority, such as aggressive or rude behavior. However, Brown and Levinson's framework can still be used if we look at the strategies they propose for relational work. The authors propose that politeness is only a relatively small part of relational work and must be seen in relation to other types of interpersonal meaning. They define relational work as the "work" individuals invest in negotiating relationships with others, encompassing both appropriate and inappropriate behavior. They argue that relational work includes both polite and impolite behavior and is equivalent to Halliday's interpersonal level of communication. The paper discusses the concept of face, derived from Goffman, and how it is socially attributed in each interaction. It argues that relational work comprises a more comprehensive notion of face than Brown and Levinson's theory. However, it also leads to a more restricted view of politeness. The authors argue that politeness is a discursive concept, not inherently defined, and that participants' perceptions of behavior are set against individual normative expectations of appropriate or politic behavior. They argue that no utterance is inherently polite, and that politeness is discursively negotiated. The paper presents five examples of naturally occurring interactions to demonstrate how relational work operates. These examples show that behavior can be appropriate, polite, or impolite, and that participants' perceptions of behavior are influenced by their own normative expectations. The authors argue that relational work is a useful concept for understanding the discursive struggle over politeness and that it encompasses a broader range of behaviors than traditional theories of politeness. They conclude that politeness is a discursive concept, not inherently defined, and that the study of relational work is a fascinating field of research that merits attention.