PREFERENCES, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ANONYMITY IN BARGAINING GAMES

PREFERENCES, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ANONYMITY IN BARGAINING GAMES

December. 1991 | Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat, Vernon Smith
This paper explores the reasons behind the observed "fairness" in ultimatum and dictator games, where first movers tend to offer more to their counterparts than noncooperative game theory predicts. The authors conducted experiments to investigate the underlying factors influencing these outcomes. They found that when the right to be the first mover is earned through a general knowledge quiz and reinforced in the instructions, first movers behave more self-regardingly. To further test the role of social influences, they conducted "double blind" dictator experiments, where individual decisions were not known to the experimenter or anyone except the decision-maker. The results showed the highest number of self-regarding offers in these experiments, suggesting that offers in such games are primarily driven by strategic and expectation considerations rather than autonomous private preferences for equity. The authors conclude that other-regarding behavior is more about expectations and social concerns rather than a taste for fairness.This paper explores the reasons behind the observed "fairness" in ultimatum and dictator games, where first movers tend to offer more to their counterparts than noncooperative game theory predicts. The authors conducted experiments to investigate the underlying factors influencing these outcomes. They found that when the right to be the first mover is earned through a general knowledge quiz and reinforced in the instructions, first movers behave more self-regardingly. To further test the role of social influences, they conducted "double blind" dictator experiments, where individual decisions were not known to the experimenter or anyone except the decision-maker. The results showed the highest number of self-regarding offers in these experiments, suggesting that offers in such games are primarily driven by strategic and expectation considerations rather than autonomous private preferences for equity. The authors conclude that other-regarding behavior is more about expectations and social concerns rather than a taste for fairness.
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