This paper examines the role of procedural, instructional, and contextual factors in shaping behavior in ultimatum and dictator games. The authors find that when the right to be the first mover is earned through a general knowledge quiz and reinforced by instructions, first movers behave more self-regarding. This contrasts with other treatments where first movers offer less. The study also highlights the importance of anonymity in reducing social influences on decision-making. The authors conducted "double blind" dictator experiments, in which neither the experimenter nor the subjects knew the decisions of others, resulting in the largest number of self-regarding offers observed. They argue that offers in ultimatum and dictator games are primarily determined by strategic and expectations considerations, rather than by an autonomous preference for fairness. The study compares different experimental treatments, including random entitlement, contest entitlement, and exchange contexts. It finds that when the task is framed as an exchange between a buyer and a seller, first movers tend to offer less than when the task is framed as a divide $10 situation. The results suggest that the context of the experiment significantly influences behavior, and that the presence of an experimenter can affect decisions by introducing social influences. The authors also discuss the implications of these findings for understanding other-regarding behavior. They argue that such behavior is not necessarily due to a preference for fairness, but rather to expectations about how others might react. The study emphasizes the importance of anonymity in reducing social influences on decision-making and suggests that the presence of an experimenter can distort results by introducing social pressures. The results of the experiments suggest that the nature of other-regarding behavior is complex and influenced by a variety of factors, including the context of the experiment, the presence of an experimenter, and the perceived fairness of the situation. The study highlights the importance of controlling for these variables in experimental research on bargaining and decision-making.This paper examines the role of procedural, instructional, and contextual factors in shaping behavior in ultimatum and dictator games. The authors find that when the right to be the first mover is earned through a general knowledge quiz and reinforced by instructions, first movers behave more self-regarding. This contrasts with other treatments where first movers offer less. The study also highlights the importance of anonymity in reducing social influences on decision-making. The authors conducted "double blind" dictator experiments, in which neither the experimenter nor the subjects knew the decisions of others, resulting in the largest number of self-regarding offers observed. They argue that offers in ultimatum and dictator games are primarily determined by strategic and expectations considerations, rather than by an autonomous preference for fairness. The study compares different experimental treatments, including random entitlement, contest entitlement, and exchange contexts. It finds that when the task is framed as an exchange between a buyer and a seller, first movers tend to offer less than when the task is framed as a divide $10 situation. The results suggest that the context of the experiment significantly influences behavior, and that the presence of an experimenter can affect decisions by introducing social influences. The authors also discuss the implications of these findings for understanding other-regarding behavior. They argue that such behavior is not necessarily due to a preference for fairness, but rather to expectations about how others might react. The study emphasizes the importance of anonymity in reducing social influences on decision-making and suggests that the presence of an experimenter can distort results by introducing social pressures. The results of the experiments suggest that the nature of other-regarding behavior is complex and influenced by a variety of factors, including the context of the experiment, the presence of an experimenter, and the perceived fairness of the situation. The study highlights the importance of controlling for these variables in experimental research on bargaining and decision-making.