This paper presents an anaphoric account of presupposition. It argues that presuppositional expressions should not be seen as referring expressions, nor should presupposition be explicated in terms of non-standard logic. Instead, presuppositional expressions are claimed to be anaphoric expressions with internal structure and semantic content. They differ from pronouns and other semantically less loaded anaphors in that they have more descriptive content, enabling them to create an antecedent if discourse does not provide one. If their capacity to accommodate is considered, they can be treated by the same mechanism that handles pronoun resolution. The theory is elaborated in the framework of discourse representation theory. It is shown that pragmatic factors interfere in the resolution of presuppositional anaphors. The resulting account is neither purely semantic nor purely pragmatic. Section 1 discusses the traditional view of presupposition as referring expressions and the problems it creates. It also discusses the inference view of presupposition, which defines presuppositions as inferences entailed by both the carrier sentence and its negation. However, this view is flawed because it relies on a monotonic entailment relation, which does not account for the non-monotonic behavior of presuppositions. Section 2 presents an alternative approach, treating presupposition as an essentially pragmatic phenomenon. It argues that presuppositions are not logical inferences but context-dependent and have a central feature in common with Gricean conversational implicatures: when they conflict with contradictory information, they do not give rise to inconsistency. Instead, conversational presumptions are lifted or altered, and the original inferences are not computed with respect to this new situation. Section 3 presents a coding of presuppositional expressions in an extension of discourse representation theory. It shows that pragmatic factors interfere in the resolution of presuppositional anaphors. The resulting account is neither purely semantic nor purely pragmatic. Section 4 discusses the constraints that govern the resolution of presuppositional anaphors. It argues that presuppositions are anaphors and can be treated by the same mechanism that handles pronoun resolution. They differ from pronouns in that they contain descriptive content which enables them to accommodate an antecedent if discourse does not provide one. They also have internal structure and can be bound by external quantifiers. The paper concludes that presuppositions are anaphors and that the same mechanism that handles pronoun resolution can be used to resolve presuppositional anaphors.This paper presents an anaphoric account of presupposition. It argues that presuppositional expressions should not be seen as referring expressions, nor should presupposition be explicated in terms of non-standard logic. Instead, presuppositional expressions are claimed to be anaphoric expressions with internal structure and semantic content. They differ from pronouns and other semantically less loaded anaphors in that they have more descriptive content, enabling them to create an antecedent if discourse does not provide one. If their capacity to accommodate is considered, they can be treated by the same mechanism that handles pronoun resolution. The theory is elaborated in the framework of discourse representation theory. It is shown that pragmatic factors interfere in the resolution of presuppositional anaphors. The resulting account is neither purely semantic nor purely pragmatic. Section 1 discusses the traditional view of presupposition as referring expressions and the problems it creates. It also discusses the inference view of presupposition, which defines presuppositions as inferences entailed by both the carrier sentence and its negation. However, this view is flawed because it relies on a monotonic entailment relation, which does not account for the non-monotonic behavior of presuppositions. Section 2 presents an alternative approach, treating presupposition as an essentially pragmatic phenomenon. It argues that presuppositions are not logical inferences but context-dependent and have a central feature in common with Gricean conversational implicatures: when they conflict with contradictory information, they do not give rise to inconsistency. Instead, conversational presumptions are lifted or altered, and the original inferences are not computed with respect to this new situation. Section 3 presents a coding of presuppositional expressions in an extension of discourse representation theory. It shows that pragmatic factors interfere in the resolution of presuppositional anaphors. The resulting account is neither purely semantic nor purely pragmatic. Section 4 discusses the constraints that govern the resolution of presuppositional anaphors. It argues that presuppositions are anaphors and can be treated by the same mechanism that handles pronoun resolution. They differ from pronouns in that they contain descriptive content which enables them to accommodate an antecedent if discourse does not provide one. They also have internal structure and can be bound by external quantifiers. The paper concludes that presuppositions are anaphors and that the same mechanism that handles pronoun resolution can be used to resolve presuppositional anaphors.