Timothy Besley’s *Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government* offers a comprehensive analysis of two key issues in political economy: the efficiency of policymaking and political agency. The book, based on Besley’s 2002 Lindahl lectures, explores the tension between normative welfare economics and public choice theory, advocating for a middle ground where government intervention can be beneficial if properly incentivized and if the right candidates are selected. Besley distinguishes between different types of government and political failures, including Pareto inefficiency, distributional failures, and Wicksellian failures. He argues that while voting can lead to political failure in a distributional or Wicksellian sense, it does not necessarily result in Pareto inefficiency under certain conditions. However, dynamic models suggest that political failures can occur when current policies affect future decision-makers. The latter half of the book focuses on the interplay between incentives and selection in political systems. Democracy is portrayed as a system that formally creates political accountability, but real-world accountability is often limited by factors such as incumbent behavior and voter information. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the literature on political agency, while Chapter 4 applies these concepts to taxation and public goods, highlighting the complex trade-offs between discipline and selection. Besley concludes that much remains to be explored in understanding political agency and efficiency, including the role of elections, collective reputations, and international leadership interactions. *Principled Agents* is a crucial resource for scholars seeking to address these questions in political economy.Timothy Besley’s *Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government* offers a comprehensive analysis of two key issues in political economy: the efficiency of policymaking and political agency. The book, based on Besley’s 2002 Lindahl lectures, explores the tension between normative welfare economics and public choice theory, advocating for a middle ground where government intervention can be beneficial if properly incentivized and if the right candidates are selected. Besley distinguishes between different types of government and political failures, including Pareto inefficiency, distributional failures, and Wicksellian failures. He argues that while voting can lead to political failure in a distributional or Wicksellian sense, it does not necessarily result in Pareto inefficiency under certain conditions. However, dynamic models suggest that political failures can occur when current policies affect future decision-makers. The latter half of the book focuses on the interplay between incentives and selection in political systems. Democracy is portrayed as a system that formally creates political accountability, but real-world accountability is often limited by factors such as incumbent behavior and voter information. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the literature on political agency, while Chapter 4 applies these concepts to taxation and public goods, highlighting the complex trade-offs between discipline and selection. Besley concludes that much remains to be explored in understanding political agency and efficiency, including the role of elections, collective reputations, and international leadership interactions. *Principled Agents* is a crucial resource for scholars seeking to address these questions in political economy.