Timothy Besley's *Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government* offers a synthetic treatment of two key issues: the efficiency of policymaking and political agency. The book, a revised version of Besley’s 2002 Lindahl lectures, begins by distinguishing between the normative tradition of welfare economics and the public choice critique. Besley advocates for a middle ground, suggesting that government intervention can be beneficial but only with proper incentives and selection processes. The public choice school initially aimed to show that real governments could fail to achieve efficient outcomes. Besley clarifies this concept in Chapter 2, distinguishing between failures of Pareto optimality, distributional failures, and Wicksellian failures. He also differentiates between government failure and political failure, which are problems that arise in democratic systems. Government failure can stem from ignorance, influence, and leader quality, while political failure can result from voting or logrolling. Besley argues that these mechanisms are unlikely to lead to Pareto inefficiency. For example, voting typically results in a distributional or Wicksellian failure rather than a Pareto failure. However, dynamic models can show robust political failures where current policies affect future policymakers' identities or preferences. The second half of the book focuses on the interaction of incentives and selection in democracy. Democracy formally creates political accountability by linking politician performance to office actions. However, there are practical limitations to this ideal, such as the difficulty of holding incumbents to strict standards and the challenge of committing to reelection rules based on observed performance. Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive overview of the "political agency" problem, using a baseline model and empirical analysis to illustrate the roles of discipline and selection. Chapter 4, co-authored with Michael Smart, revisits these issues in the context of taxation and public goods, extending the model to study the impact of information, debt, and the comparison of NGOs to government provision. The key finding is that better information can decrease voter welfare by compromising discipline while enhancing selection. The book concludes by highlighting the need for further research on political agency and efficiency, including the role of collective reputations and the interaction of leaders in international affairs. *Principled Agents* is an essential resource for scholars exploring these topics.Timothy Besley's *Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government* offers a synthetic treatment of two key issues: the efficiency of policymaking and political agency. The book, a revised version of Besley’s 2002 Lindahl lectures, begins by distinguishing between the normative tradition of welfare economics and the public choice critique. Besley advocates for a middle ground, suggesting that government intervention can be beneficial but only with proper incentives and selection processes. The public choice school initially aimed to show that real governments could fail to achieve efficient outcomes. Besley clarifies this concept in Chapter 2, distinguishing between failures of Pareto optimality, distributional failures, and Wicksellian failures. He also differentiates between government failure and political failure, which are problems that arise in democratic systems. Government failure can stem from ignorance, influence, and leader quality, while political failure can result from voting or logrolling. Besley argues that these mechanisms are unlikely to lead to Pareto inefficiency. For example, voting typically results in a distributional or Wicksellian failure rather than a Pareto failure. However, dynamic models can show robust political failures where current policies affect future policymakers' identities or preferences. The second half of the book focuses on the interaction of incentives and selection in democracy. Democracy formally creates political accountability by linking politician performance to office actions. However, there are practical limitations to this ideal, such as the difficulty of holding incumbents to strict standards and the challenge of committing to reelection rules based on observed performance. Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive overview of the "political agency" problem, using a baseline model and empirical analysis to illustrate the roles of discipline and selection. Chapter 4, co-authored with Michael Smart, revisits these issues in the context of taxation and public goods, extending the model to study the impact of information, debt, and the comparison of NGOs to government provision. The key finding is that better information can decrease voter welfare by compromising discipline while enhancing selection. The book concludes by highlighting the need for further research on political agency and efficiency, including the role of collective reputations and the interaction of leaders in international affairs. *Principled Agents* is an essential resource for scholars exploring these topics.