The paper by Edella Schlager and Elinor Ostrom, titled "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," published in *Land Economics* in 1992, aims to clarify the often ambiguous term "common-property resource" and develop a conceptual schema for understanding property-rights regimes. The authors distinguish between different bundles of rights, including authorized users, claimants, proprietors, and owners, each with distinct levels of authority and incentives. They argue that these rights are not static and can be transferred, and that the specific bundle of rights held by users significantly affects their incentives and outcomes. The paper applies this conceptual schema to analyze empirical settings, particularly focusing on the Maine lobster industry. It highlights the importance of de facto and de jure property rights, where de facto rights are those enforced by resource users themselves, while de jure rights are recognized by government authorities. The authors discuss how different property rights systems, such as those in Maine, can lead to varying outcomes, with de facto proprietor rights often resulting in more stable and efficient resource management compared to de jure authorized user rights. The study concludes that effective property rights systems for managing inshore fisheries are challenging to develop, regardless of the regime chosen. It emphasizes the need for a better understanding of the conditions that enhance or detract from the emergence of efficient property-rights regimes, the stability of these systems under various changes, and the costs of enforcing regulations that may not be agreed upon by all stakeholders. The authors advocate for a comparative institutional analysis to evaluate the performance of different property-rights regimes in real-world settings.The paper by Edella Schlager and Elinor Ostrom, titled "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," published in *Land Economics* in 1992, aims to clarify the often ambiguous term "common-property resource" and develop a conceptual schema for understanding property-rights regimes. The authors distinguish between different bundles of rights, including authorized users, claimants, proprietors, and owners, each with distinct levels of authority and incentives. They argue that these rights are not static and can be transferred, and that the specific bundle of rights held by users significantly affects their incentives and outcomes. The paper applies this conceptual schema to analyze empirical settings, particularly focusing on the Maine lobster industry. It highlights the importance of de facto and de jure property rights, where de facto rights are those enforced by resource users themselves, while de jure rights are recognized by government authorities. The authors discuss how different property rights systems, such as those in Maine, can lead to varying outcomes, with de facto proprietor rights often resulting in more stable and efficient resource management compared to de jure authorized user rights. The study concludes that effective property rights systems for managing inshore fisheries are challenging to develop, regardless of the regime chosen. It emphasizes the need for a better understanding of the conditions that enhance or detract from the emergence of efficient property-rights regimes, the stability of these systems under various changes, and the costs of enforcing regulations that may not be agreed upon by all stakeholders. The authors advocate for a comparative institutional analysis to evaluate the performance of different property-rights regimes in real-world settings.