Protein design meets biosecurity

Protein design meets biosecurity

26 JANUARY 2024 | David Baker and George Church
The chapter discusses the rapid advancements in computational protein design, driven by the integration of artificial intelligence (AI), and its potential to transform biotechnology. While this technology holds promise for addressing global challenges such as pathogens, neurodegenerative diseases, and ecosystem degradation, it also poses risks of misuse, particularly in the production of dangerous biological agents. To mitigate these risks, the authors propose that all synthetic gene sequences and synthesis data should be collected and stored in secure repositories, with queries limited to emergencies. This approach ensures safe and secure protein design while facilitating progress in biotechnology. The chapter highlights the importance of biosecurity measures, such as screening and logging all synthesized genetic sequences, to prevent the creation of harmful biomolecules. It references the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC) and its voluntary adoption of DNA synthesis regulation since 2004. The authors recommend extending these practices to benchtop nucleic acid synthesizers and standardizing them internationally. They emphasize that enhanced security should not hinder information sharing or transparent communication, and that an international group like the IGSC should lead this effort, working with governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The chapter concludes by advocating for a balanced approach that maximizes progress in addressing societal concerns while ensuring the safety and security of the field.The chapter discusses the rapid advancements in computational protein design, driven by the integration of artificial intelligence (AI), and its potential to transform biotechnology. While this technology holds promise for addressing global challenges such as pathogens, neurodegenerative diseases, and ecosystem degradation, it also poses risks of misuse, particularly in the production of dangerous biological agents. To mitigate these risks, the authors propose that all synthetic gene sequences and synthesis data should be collected and stored in secure repositories, with queries limited to emergencies. This approach ensures safe and secure protein design while facilitating progress in biotechnology. The chapter highlights the importance of biosecurity measures, such as screening and logging all synthesized genetic sequences, to prevent the creation of harmful biomolecules. It references the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC) and its voluntary adoption of DNA synthesis regulation since 2004. The authors recommend extending these practices to benchtop nucleic acid synthesizers and standardizing them internationally. They emphasize that enhanced security should not hinder information sharing or transparent communication, and that an international group like the IGSC should lead this effort, working with governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The chapter concludes by advocating for a balanced approach that maximizes progress in addressing societal concerns while ensuring the safety and security of the field.
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