This paper addresses the threat of power trace attacks on quantum computers, which involve recovering information about control pulses sent to quantum computers. The authors formalize and demonstrate two types of single trace attacks: per-channel and total power attacks. Per-channel attacks rely on measuring power traces from individual qubit channels to perform a brute-force reconstruction of the quantum circuit, while total power attacks use a single power trace to reconstruct the circuit through Mixed-Integer Linear Programming optimization. The evaluation on 32 real benchmark quantum circuits shows that the proposed techniques are highly effective in reconstructing quantum circuits. The findings highlight the need for new methods to protect quantum circuits from power trace attacks, emphasizing the importance of safeguarding intellectual property and sensitive data in quantum computing.This paper addresses the threat of power trace attacks on quantum computers, which involve recovering information about control pulses sent to quantum computers. The authors formalize and demonstrate two types of single trace attacks: per-channel and total power attacks. Per-channel attacks rely on measuring power traces from individual qubit channels to perform a brute-force reconstruction of the quantum circuit, while total power attacks use a single power trace to reconstruct the circuit through Mixed-Integer Linear Programming optimization. The evaluation on 32 real benchmark quantum circuits shows that the proposed techniques are highly effective in reconstructing quantum circuits. The findings highlight the need for new methods to protect quantum circuits from power trace attacks, emphasizing the importance of safeguarding intellectual property and sensitive data in quantum computing.