This paper investigates the impact of bank-firm relationships on loan rates and collateral requirements for very small firms in a European bank-dominated system. Using data from nearly 18,000 bank loans, the authors examine the price and non-price terms of loan contracts. The study tests for intertemporal rent-shifting by banks and finds two opposing effects: the length of the bank-firm relationship increases the loan rate, while buying other information-sensitive products from the bank decreases the loan rate. The effect on the price is more influenced by the intensity of the relationship than its length. Additionally, the length of the financial relationship slightly negatively affects the probability of pledging collateral. The findings suggest that relationship lending is a multidimensional concept, with the intensity of the relationship playing a crucial role in determining loan rates and collateral decisions.This paper investigates the impact of bank-firm relationships on loan rates and collateral requirements for very small firms in a European bank-dominated system. Using data from nearly 18,000 bank loans, the authors examine the price and non-price terms of loan contracts. The study tests for intertemporal rent-shifting by banks and finds two opposing effects: the length of the bank-firm relationship increases the loan rate, while buying other information-sensitive products from the bank decreases the loan rate. The effect on the price is more influenced by the intensity of the relationship than its length. Additionally, the length of the financial relationship slightly negatively affects the probability of pledging collateral. The findings suggest that relationship lending is a multidimensional concept, with the intensity of the relationship playing a crucial role in determining loan rates and collateral decisions.