This paper by Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella explores the relationship between rents, competition, and corruption. The authors argue that corruption is often driven by the rents generated from natural resources or market power, which can be reduced through increased competition. They develop a theoretical model to explain how competition affects corruption and conduct empirical analysis using data from two sources: the Business International Corporation (BI) and the World Competitiveness Report (WCR). The results suggest that countries with higher rents, such as those sheltered from foreign competition or with market dominance by a few firms, tend to have higher corruption levels. The authors conclude that policies aimed at increasing market competition could help control corruption.This paper by Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella explores the relationship between rents, competition, and corruption. The authors argue that corruption is often driven by the rents generated from natural resources or market power, which can be reduced through increased competition. They develop a theoretical model to explain how competition affects corruption and conduct empirical analysis using data from two sources: the Business International Corporation (BI) and the World Competitiveness Report (WCR). The results suggest that countries with higher rents, such as those sheltered from foreign competition or with market dominance by a few firms, tend to have higher corruption levels. The authors conclude that policies aimed at increasing market competition could help control corruption.