Crawford and Sobel (1982) analyze strategic information transmission in a model where a better-informed Sender (S) sends a possibly noisy signal to a Receiver (R), who then takes an action that affects both parties' welfare. They show that in equilibrium, S partitions the support of his private information and introduces noise by reporting only which partition his observation lies in. Under further assumptions, the equilibrium with the largest number of partitions is Pareto-superior and more informative when agents' preferences are more similar. The paper discusses the implications of this model for bargaining, business partnerships, and other strategic communication scenarios. It also highlights the importance of rational expectations and the role of preferences in determining the informativeness of equilibrium signals. The authors conclude that their model provides a general framework for understanding strategic communication and its effects on decision-making.Crawford and Sobel (1982) analyze strategic information transmission in a model where a better-informed Sender (S) sends a possibly noisy signal to a Receiver (R), who then takes an action that affects both parties' welfare. They show that in equilibrium, S partitions the support of his private information and introduces noise by reporting only which partition his observation lies in. Under further assumptions, the equilibrium with the largest number of partitions is Pareto-superior and more informative when agents' preferences are more similar. The paper discusses the implications of this model for bargaining, business partnerships, and other strategic communication scenarios. It also highlights the importance of rational expectations and the role of preferences in determining the informativeness of equilibrium signals. The authors conclude that their model provides a general framework for understanding strategic communication and its effects on decision-making.