This article presents a survey of secure ad hoc routing protocols for mobile wireless networks. Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are collections of nodes connected through wireless mediums, forming rapidly changing topologies. Existing routing protocols for MANETs do not address possible threats to the protocol's operation, as the assumption of a trusted environment is not realistic. Several efforts have been made to design secure and robust routing protocols for MANETs. The article briefly presents the most popular protocols that follow table-driven and source-initiated on-demand approaches. It then formulates a threat model for ad hoc routing and presents specific attacks that can target the operation of a protocol. The proposed secure ad hoc routing protocols are classified into five categories: solutions based on asymmetric cryptography, solutions based on symmetric cryptography, hybrid solutions, reputation-based solutions, and add-on mechanisms that satisfy specific security requirements. A comparison of these solutions provides a basis for future research in this rapidly evolving area. The article discusses the challenges of routing in mobile ad hoc networks compared to traditional wired networks. It presents two main design approaches: table-driven and source-initiated on-demand. Examples of these protocols include DSDV and OLSR for table-driven, and AODV and DSR for source-initiated on-demand. The article then discusses security problems with existing ad hoc routing protocols, such as location disclosure, black hole, replay, wormhole, blackmail, denial of service, and routing table poisoning. It also presents several secure ad hoc routing protocols, including ARAN, SRP, SEAD, Ariadne, SAODV, and SLSP. These protocols use various cryptographic techniques, including asymmetric and symmetric cryptography, hash chains, and reputation-based mechanisms, to provide security against these threats. The article concludes by discussing the challenges and future research directions in the field of secure ad hoc routing.This article presents a survey of secure ad hoc routing protocols for mobile wireless networks. Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are collections of nodes connected through wireless mediums, forming rapidly changing topologies. Existing routing protocols for MANETs do not address possible threats to the protocol's operation, as the assumption of a trusted environment is not realistic. Several efforts have been made to design secure and robust routing protocols for MANETs. The article briefly presents the most popular protocols that follow table-driven and source-initiated on-demand approaches. It then formulates a threat model for ad hoc routing and presents specific attacks that can target the operation of a protocol. The proposed secure ad hoc routing protocols are classified into five categories: solutions based on asymmetric cryptography, solutions based on symmetric cryptography, hybrid solutions, reputation-based solutions, and add-on mechanisms that satisfy specific security requirements. A comparison of these solutions provides a basis for future research in this rapidly evolving area. The article discusses the challenges of routing in mobile ad hoc networks compared to traditional wired networks. It presents two main design approaches: table-driven and source-initiated on-demand. Examples of these protocols include DSDV and OLSR for table-driven, and AODV and DSR for source-initiated on-demand. The article then discusses security problems with existing ad hoc routing protocols, such as location disclosure, black hole, replay, wormhole, blackmail, denial of service, and routing table poisoning. It also presents several secure ad hoc routing protocols, including ARAN, SRP, SEAD, Ariadne, SAODV, and SLSP. These protocols use various cryptographic techniques, including asymmetric and symmetric cryptography, hash chains, and reputation-based mechanisms, to provide security against these threats. The article concludes by discussing the challenges and future research directions in the field of secure ad hoc routing.