This paper examines the relationship between career concerns and herding behavior in the labor market for security analysts. Using job tenure as a proxy for career concerns, the authors find that more experienced analysts are more likely to produce timely earnings forecasts and deviate more from the consensus forecast than younger analysts. These findings are consistent with reputation-based models of herding, where analysts may adjust their behavior to maintain their reputation. The authors also find that forecast accuracy and frequency of forecast revisions vary with job tenure, though these results do not fundamentally alter the interpretation of the main findings. The study uses data from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database, which contains earnings forecasts from thousands of analysts. The authors construct measures of herding based on the timing of forecasts and deviation from the consensus forecast. They find that older analysts are more likely to produce forecasts before younger analysts and deviate more from the consensus forecast. These results suggest that older analysts herd less than younger analysts. The authors also find that forecast accuracy and frequency of revisions vary with job tenure, though these results are considered auxiliary. The study highlights the importance of career concerns in shaping analyst behavior and provides evidence that reputation-based herding mechanisms are at work in the submission of earnings forecasts. The findings suggest that the labor market for security analysts shares characteristics with other labor markets considered in reputation and herding models. The study contributes to the understanding of how career concerns influence forecasting behavior and provides insights into the mechanisms behind the generation of earnings forecasts.This paper examines the relationship between career concerns and herding behavior in the labor market for security analysts. Using job tenure as a proxy for career concerns, the authors find that more experienced analysts are more likely to produce timely earnings forecasts and deviate more from the consensus forecast than younger analysts. These findings are consistent with reputation-based models of herding, where analysts may adjust their behavior to maintain their reputation. The authors also find that forecast accuracy and frequency of forecast revisions vary with job tenure, though these results do not fundamentally alter the interpretation of the main findings. The study uses data from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database, which contains earnings forecasts from thousands of analysts. The authors construct measures of herding based on the timing of forecasts and deviation from the consensus forecast. They find that older analysts are more likely to produce forecasts before younger analysts and deviate more from the consensus forecast. These results suggest that older analysts herd less than younger analysts. The authors also find that forecast accuracy and frequency of revisions vary with job tenure, though these results are considered auxiliary. The study highlights the importance of career concerns in shaping analyst behavior and provides evidence that reputation-based herding mechanisms are at work in the submission of earnings forecasts. The findings suggest that the labor market for security analysts shares characteristics with other labor markets considered in reputation and herding models. The study contributes to the understanding of how career concerns influence forecasting behavior and provides insights into the mechanisms behind the generation of earnings forecasts.