The paper by Ran Canetti presents a general framework for defining security in multiparty cryptographic protocols, focusing on the task of evaluating a probabilistic function of the parties' inputs. The author introduces a new definition of security that is both simple and minimal, aiming to capture the intuitive notion of security while maintaining rigor. The definition is based on the paradigm of known definitions but includes substantial modifications and simplifications. The paper also discusses the composition of protocols, showing that security is preserved under a natural composition operation, which is formalized by Micali and Rogaway. The security definitions are applied to various standard settings, including eavesdropping, Byzantine, nonadaptive, and adaptive adversaries, as well as information-theoretic and computational models. In the computational model, the paper provides the first definition of security that is shown to be preserved under composition. The approach taken in the paper generalizes the "simulation approach" used in previous works and is applicable to a wide range of adversary models. The paper also includes a detailed discussion of the definitional efforts of previous works and provides a modular composition theorem for the considered settings.The paper by Ran Canetti presents a general framework for defining security in multiparty cryptographic protocols, focusing on the task of evaluating a probabilistic function of the parties' inputs. The author introduces a new definition of security that is both simple and minimal, aiming to capture the intuitive notion of security while maintaining rigor. The definition is based on the paradigm of known definitions but includes substantial modifications and simplifications. The paper also discusses the composition of protocols, showing that security is preserved under a natural composition operation, which is formalized by Micali and Rogaway. The security definitions are applied to various standard settings, including eavesdropping, Byzantine, nonadaptive, and adaptive adversaries, as well as information-theoretic and computational models. In the computational model, the paper provides the first definition of security that is shown to be preserved under composition. The approach taken in the paper generalizes the "simulation approach" used in previous works and is applicable to a wide range of adversary models. The paper also includes a detailed discussion of the definitional efforts of previous works and provides a modular composition theorem for the considered settings.