This paper explores the role of separation of powers in enhancing political accountability and preventing the abuse of power in democracies. The authors argue that while elections are a primary mechanism for disciplining public officials, they are not sufficient on their own. The separation of powers between the executive and legislative bodies, combined with appropriate checks and balances, helps prevent the abuse of power. Checks and balances create a conflict of interests between the executive and the legislature, yet both bodies must agree on public policy, which disciplines each other at the voters' advantage. The paper also discusses how separation of powers can help voters elicit information from elected officials, thereby reducing informational rents. The authors use a principal-agent framework to analyze the interaction between the executive and the legislature, treating their interaction as a game. They find that separation of powers improves accountability and voter utility only under appropriate checks and balances. This involves creating a conflict of interests between the executive and the legislature, and requiring joint agreement on policy decisions. The paper provides examples of how this can be achieved in budgetary processes, where decisions are split into two stages, each requiring the consent of both bodies. The paper also examines the implications of separation of powers in different constitutional structures, such as presidential and parliamentary systems. It highlights the importance of direct control over the executive in presidential systems, which minimizes the risk of collusion between the legislature and the executive over reappointment. The authors conclude that the benefits of separation of powers lie in its ability to align the interests of the weaker party with those of voters, thereby enhancing accountability and reducing rents from office.This paper explores the role of separation of powers in enhancing political accountability and preventing the abuse of power in democracies. The authors argue that while elections are a primary mechanism for disciplining public officials, they are not sufficient on their own. The separation of powers between the executive and legislative bodies, combined with appropriate checks and balances, helps prevent the abuse of power. Checks and balances create a conflict of interests between the executive and the legislature, yet both bodies must agree on public policy, which disciplines each other at the voters' advantage. The paper also discusses how separation of powers can help voters elicit information from elected officials, thereby reducing informational rents. The authors use a principal-agent framework to analyze the interaction between the executive and the legislature, treating their interaction as a game. They find that separation of powers improves accountability and voter utility only under appropriate checks and balances. This involves creating a conflict of interests between the executive and the legislature, and requiring joint agreement on policy decisions. The paper provides examples of how this can be achieved in budgetary processes, where decisions are split into two stages, each requiring the consent of both bodies. The paper also examines the implications of separation of powers in different constitutional structures, such as presidential and parliamentary systems. It highlights the importance of direct control over the executive in presidential systems, which minimizes the risk of collusion between the legislature and the executive over reappointment. The authors conclude that the benefits of separation of powers lie in its ability to align the interests of the weaker party with those of voters, thereby enhancing accountability and reducing rents from office.