Social Choice and Individual Values by Kenneth J. Arrow. This book explores the theory of social choice, which is the study of how individual preferences can be aggregated into a collective decision. Arrow's work is foundational in the field of economics and political science. He examines the conditions under which collective decisions can be made that reflect the preferences of individuals. The book discusses the concept of a social welfare function, which is a way of aggregating individual preferences into a single social preference order. Arrow's most famous result is the impossibility theorem, which states that no voting system can satisfy a set of seemingly reasonable criteria for fairness and consistency. This theorem has profound implications for the theory of democracy and the design of voting systems. The book also covers various aspects of individual values, including the nature of preferences, the role of utility functions, and the relationship between individual and collective decision-making. Arrow's analysis is rigorous and mathematical, making it a challenging but essential read for those interested in economic theory and social choice. The book was published in 1951 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, and Chapman & Hall, Limited, London. It is a seminal work that has influenced numerous subsequent studies in economics, political science, and philosophy. Arrow's contributions have been recognized with numerous awards, including the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. The book remains a key reference for understanding the complexities of social choice and the challenges of aggregating individual values into collective decisions.Social Choice and Individual Values by Kenneth J. Arrow. This book explores the theory of social choice, which is the study of how individual preferences can be aggregated into a collective decision. Arrow's work is foundational in the field of economics and political science. He examines the conditions under which collective decisions can be made that reflect the preferences of individuals. The book discusses the concept of a social welfare function, which is a way of aggregating individual preferences into a single social preference order. Arrow's most famous result is the impossibility theorem, which states that no voting system can satisfy a set of seemingly reasonable criteria for fairness and consistency. This theorem has profound implications for the theory of democracy and the design of voting systems. The book also covers various aspects of individual values, including the nature of preferences, the role of utility functions, and the relationship between individual and collective decision-making. Arrow's analysis is rigorous and mathematical, making it a challenging but essential read for those interested in economic theory and social choice. The book was published in 1951 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, and Chapman & Hall, Limited, London. It is a seminal work that has influenced numerous subsequent studies in economics, political science, and philosophy. Arrow's contributions have been recognized with numerous awards, including the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. The book remains a key reference for understanding the complexities of social choice and the challenges of aggregating individual values into collective decisions.