The paper examines the "prospect of upward mobility" (POUM) hypothesis, which suggests that even relatively poor people oppose high rates of redistribution because they or their children may move up the income ladder. The authors formally establish the basis for this hypothesis, showing that there is a range of incomes below the mean where agents oppose lasting redistributions if and only if their expected income tomorrow is increasing and concave in today's income. The more concave the transition function and the longer the policy horizon, the lower the demand for redistribution. The paper also discusses the role of idiosyncratic income shocks and provides empirical evidence from the PSID, finding that the POUM effect is significant in the data. The authors conclude that the POUM hypothesis can explain why democracies, where a relatively poor majority holds political power, do not engage in large-scale expropriation and highly progressive redistribution.The paper examines the "prospect of upward mobility" (POUM) hypothesis, which suggests that even relatively poor people oppose high rates of redistribution because they or their children may move up the income ladder. The authors formally establish the basis for this hypothesis, showing that there is a range of incomes below the mean where agents oppose lasting redistributions if and only if their expected income tomorrow is increasing and concave in today's income. The more concave the transition function and the longer the policy horizon, the lower the demand for redistribution. The paper also discusses the role of idiosyncratic income shocks and provides empirical evidence from the PSID, finding that the POUM effect is significant in the data. The authors conclude that the POUM hypothesis can explain why democracies, where a relatively poor majority holds political power, do not engage in large-scale expropriation and highly progressive redistribution.