Lisa Feldman Barrett argues that the experience of emotion is not a fixed, discrete entity but rather a process of conceptualization and categorization guided by embodied knowledge. She challenges the traditional view that emotions are natural kinds with clear, consistent criteria, proposing instead that emotions arise from the act of categorizing affective experiences. This model aligns with social psychological theories of person perception and embodied conceptual knowledge, suggesting that emotions are not innate but are constructed through the process of categorization. Barrett highlights the paradox that while people believe they can recognize emotions, scientific evidence does not support clear, objective criteria for identifying them. She argues that emotions are not entities that can be measured in a straightforward way, but rather are experienced through the process of conceptualizing affective states. This view challenges the traditional assumption that emotions are discrete and have clear physiological and behavioral markers. Barrett discusses the limitations of current methods for measuring emotional experiences, noting that physiological, behavioral, and experiential outputs for each emotion category are only weakly intercorrelated. She argues that self-reports, while fallible, provide valuable insights into the experience of emotion, particularly in terms of valence (pleasure–displeasure) and arousal (activation–deactivation). These dimensions are not merely artifacts of language but reflect fundamental aspects of emotional experience. Barrett also explores the concept of emotional granularity, arguing that individuals vary in their ability to distinguish between different emotional experiences. Those with higher emotional granularity can identify and describe more nuanced emotional states, while those with lower granularity tend to use more general terms. This variation suggests that not all people experience emotions in the same way, and that emotional experiences are not necessarily primitive or fixed. Finally, Barrett proposes that emotions are not biologically given but are constructed through the process of categorization. The experience of emotion occurs when conceptual knowledge about emotion is applied during the act of categorization. This view challenges the traditional natural-kind view of emotions and offers a new framework for understanding the complexity and diversity of emotional experiences.Lisa Feldman Barrett argues that the experience of emotion is not a fixed, discrete entity but rather a process of conceptualization and categorization guided by embodied knowledge. She challenges the traditional view that emotions are natural kinds with clear, consistent criteria, proposing instead that emotions arise from the act of categorizing affective experiences. This model aligns with social psychological theories of person perception and embodied conceptual knowledge, suggesting that emotions are not innate but are constructed through the process of categorization. Barrett highlights the paradox that while people believe they can recognize emotions, scientific evidence does not support clear, objective criteria for identifying them. She argues that emotions are not entities that can be measured in a straightforward way, but rather are experienced through the process of conceptualizing affective states. This view challenges the traditional assumption that emotions are discrete and have clear physiological and behavioral markers. Barrett discusses the limitations of current methods for measuring emotional experiences, noting that physiological, behavioral, and experiential outputs for each emotion category are only weakly intercorrelated. She argues that self-reports, while fallible, provide valuable insights into the experience of emotion, particularly in terms of valence (pleasure–displeasure) and arousal (activation–deactivation). These dimensions are not merely artifacts of language but reflect fundamental aspects of emotional experience. Barrett also explores the concept of emotional granularity, arguing that individuals vary in their ability to distinguish between different emotional experiences. Those with higher emotional granularity can identify and describe more nuanced emotional states, while those with lower granularity tend to use more general terms. This variation suggests that not all people experience emotions in the same way, and that emotional experiences are not necessarily primitive or fixed. Finally, Barrett proposes that emotions are not biologically given but are constructed through the process of categorization. The experience of emotion occurs when conceptual knowledge about emotion is applied during the act of categorization. This view challenges the traditional natural-kind view of emotions and offers a new framework for understanding the complexity and diversity of emotional experiences.