The article explores the paradox of European integration, where frustration coexists with resilience and progress with stagnation. It argues that this paradox can be explained by the "joint-decision trap," a phenomenon observed in both German federalism and the European Community. In both cases, member governments directly participate in central decisions, and unanimous agreements are required, leading to sub-optimal policy outcomes unless a problem-solving approach is maintained. However, the prevailing style has been bargaining, resulting in public policy pathologies. Despite these issues, the European Community has not disintegrated, nor has it achieved significant progress in policy responsibilities. The "joint-decision trap" is attributed to the utility functions of member governments, who find the current institutional arrangements optimal despite their sub-optimal policy outputs compared to greater centralization or disintegration. The article also discusses the historical context of European integration, the differences between American and German federalism, and the specific challenges faced by the European Community in areas like the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Despite criticisms and efforts to reform, the CAP remains a central issue, reflecting the persistent "joint-decision trap" in European integration.The article explores the paradox of European integration, where frustration coexists with resilience and progress with stagnation. It argues that this paradox can be explained by the "joint-decision trap," a phenomenon observed in both German federalism and the European Community. In both cases, member governments directly participate in central decisions, and unanimous agreements are required, leading to sub-optimal policy outcomes unless a problem-solving approach is maintained. However, the prevailing style has been bargaining, resulting in public policy pathologies. Despite these issues, the European Community has not disintegrated, nor has it achieved significant progress in policy responsibilities. The "joint-decision trap" is attributed to the utility functions of member governments, who find the current institutional arrangements optimal despite their sub-optimal policy outputs compared to greater centralization or disintegration. The article also discusses the historical context of European integration, the differences between American and German federalism, and the specific challenges faced by the European Community in areas like the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Despite criticisms and efforts to reform, the CAP remains a central issue, reflecting the persistent "joint-decision trap" in European integration.