Anant K. Sundaram and Andrew C. Inkpen revisit the debate on the corporate objective, emphasizing that maximizing shareholder value remains the preferred corporate goal. They trace the origins of the debate from the late 19th century, highlighting its implications for corporate law and governance in the U.S. The debate has evolved through various perspectives, including stakeholder theory and the idea of managing multiple goals. However, the authors argue that shareholder value maximization is the best objective because it is based on an observable and measurable metric, not because it is legal, ethical, or expedient. They acknowledge critiques of the shareholder value maximization view but argue that these critiques are not unique to this view and will persist even if the firm is managed for nonshareowning stakeholders. The authors examine the historical evolution of corporate goals in the U.S., noting the shift from stakeholder concerns to shareholder primacy, particularly after the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression. The 1930s saw a resurgence of stakeholder concerns, but by the 1970s, the focus had shifted back to shareholder value. The rise of agency theory and the market for corporate control in the 1980s further reinforced the shareholder value maximization view. Despite legislative efforts to incorporate stakeholder interests, these efforts had limited impact on U.S. corporate law. The authors also address the stakeholder argument, noting that stakeholder management involves balancing multiple objectives and relationships. However, they argue that having multiple objective functions can lead to confusion and dithering in decision-making. They also note that nonshareowning stakeholders can become shareholders, but the reverse is not easy. Additionally, stakeholders have greater ability to explicitly contract with the firm and thus have more legal recourse. The authors conclude that maximizing shareholder value is the preferred corporate goal because it is a single-valued metric that is observable and measurable. They acknowledge that this view may lead to value transfer from other stakeholders, but argue that this is not unique to the shareholder value maximization view. They also note that firms in stakeholder-oriented economies like Europe and Japan are not necessarily more responsible corporate citizens or less prone to stock market bubbles than U.S. firms. Finally, they address critiques of shareholder value maximization, including the implications of contract failures and the distributional implications of governance. They argue that while there are challenges, the shareholder value maximization view remains the most effective and practical approach to corporate governance.Anant K. Sundaram and Andrew C. Inkpen revisit the debate on the corporate objective, emphasizing that maximizing shareholder value remains the preferred corporate goal. They trace the origins of the debate from the late 19th century, highlighting its implications for corporate law and governance in the U.S. The debate has evolved through various perspectives, including stakeholder theory and the idea of managing multiple goals. However, the authors argue that shareholder value maximization is the best objective because it is based on an observable and measurable metric, not because it is legal, ethical, or expedient. They acknowledge critiques of the shareholder value maximization view but argue that these critiques are not unique to this view and will persist even if the firm is managed for nonshareowning stakeholders. The authors examine the historical evolution of corporate goals in the U.S., noting the shift from stakeholder concerns to shareholder primacy, particularly after the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression. The 1930s saw a resurgence of stakeholder concerns, but by the 1970s, the focus had shifted back to shareholder value. The rise of agency theory and the market for corporate control in the 1980s further reinforced the shareholder value maximization view. Despite legislative efforts to incorporate stakeholder interests, these efforts had limited impact on U.S. corporate law. The authors also address the stakeholder argument, noting that stakeholder management involves balancing multiple objectives and relationships. However, they argue that having multiple objective functions can lead to confusion and dithering in decision-making. They also note that nonshareowning stakeholders can become shareholders, but the reverse is not easy. Additionally, stakeholders have greater ability to explicitly contract with the firm and thus have more legal recourse. The authors conclude that maximizing shareholder value is the preferred corporate goal because it is a single-valued metric that is observable and measurable. They acknowledge that this view may lead to value transfer from other stakeholders, but argue that this is not unique to the shareholder value maximization view. They also note that firms in stakeholder-oriented economies like Europe and Japan are not necessarily more responsible corporate citizens or less prone to stock market bubbles than U.S. firms. Finally, they address critiques of shareholder value maximization, including the implications of contract failures and the distributional implications of governance. They argue that while there are challenges, the shareholder value maximization view remains the most effective and practical approach to corporate governance.