This paper analyzes the impact of price incentives on intrinsic motivation, focusing on the "crowding-out" effect. It examines how monetary compensation can reduce individuals' willingness to support socially desirable but locally unwanted projects, such as nuclear waste repositories. The study is based on an empirical analysis of Swiss residents' reactions to monetary compensation for accepting a nuclear waste repository. The paper presents a theoretical framework derived from social psychology, suggesting that intrinsic motivation is partially destroyed when price incentives are introduced. This leads to a reduction in the effectiveness of price mechanisms. The study tests this theory using data from a survey of Swiss residents, where respondents were asked whether they would accept a nuclear waste repository in their community, both with and without compensation. The results show that when compensation is offered, the level of acceptance of the nuclear waste repository decreases. This is attributed to the crowding-out effect, where monetary rewards undermine intrinsic motivation. The study also finds that the general support for nuclear energy and the quality of the site selection process positively influence the willingness to accept the repository, but these effects are weakened when compensation is introduced. The paper concludes that price incentives can be less effective when they crowd out civic duty. It suggests that in areas where intrinsic motivation is important, price incentives should be used with caution. The findings have implications for economic theory and policy, highlighting the limitations of monetary compensation in rallying support for socially desirable projects.This paper analyzes the impact of price incentives on intrinsic motivation, focusing on the "crowding-out" effect. It examines how monetary compensation can reduce individuals' willingness to support socially desirable but locally unwanted projects, such as nuclear waste repositories. The study is based on an empirical analysis of Swiss residents' reactions to monetary compensation for accepting a nuclear waste repository. The paper presents a theoretical framework derived from social psychology, suggesting that intrinsic motivation is partially destroyed when price incentives are introduced. This leads to a reduction in the effectiveness of price mechanisms. The study tests this theory using data from a survey of Swiss residents, where respondents were asked whether they would accept a nuclear waste repository in their community, both with and without compensation. The results show that when compensation is offered, the level of acceptance of the nuclear waste repository decreases. This is attributed to the crowding-out effect, where monetary rewards undermine intrinsic motivation. The study also finds that the general support for nuclear energy and the quality of the site selection process positively influence the willingness to accept the repository, but these effects are weakened when compensation is introduced. The paper concludes that price incentives can be less effective when they crowd out civic duty. It suggests that in areas where intrinsic motivation is important, price incentives should be used with caution. The findings have implications for economic theory and policy, highlighting the limitations of monetary compensation in rallying support for socially desirable projects.