The paper by Ray Ball, S. P. Kothari, and Ashok Robin examines the impact of international institutional factors on the properties of accounting earnings. The authors find that earnings are more timely in incorporating value-relevant information in common-law countries (Australia, Canada, U.S., and UK) compared to code-law countries (France, Germany, and Japan). This is attributed to differences in solving information asymmetry under "shareholder" corporate governance (public disclosure) versus "stakeholder" governance (private communication), and the direct linkage of reported earnings to current payouts in code-law countries. Earnings in most countries studied are conservative, tilting towards timely incorporation of bad news due to information asymmetry. Common-law countries' earnings are more conservative due to greater information asymmetry, regulation, and expected costs of investor litigation. UK earnings are the least conservative among common-law countries, due to private debt, lower regulation, and litigation costs. Tax laws, legal restrictions on undistributed earnings, and code-law institutional links between earnings and dividends reduce the timeliness of earnings relative to dividends. Earnings are more timely than cash flows in all countries studied, and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings has increased over time in most countries. The findings have implications for security analysts, accounting standard-setters, regulators, and corporate governance.The paper by Ray Ball, S. P. Kothari, and Ashok Robin examines the impact of international institutional factors on the properties of accounting earnings. The authors find that earnings are more timely in incorporating value-relevant information in common-law countries (Australia, Canada, U.S., and UK) compared to code-law countries (France, Germany, and Japan). This is attributed to differences in solving information asymmetry under "shareholder" corporate governance (public disclosure) versus "stakeholder" governance (private communication), and the direct linkage of reported earnings to current payouts in code-law countries. Earnings in most countries studied are conservative, tilting towards timely incorporation of bad news due to information asymmetry. Common-law countries' earnings are more conservative due to greater information asymmetry, regulation, and expected costs of investor litigation. UK earnings are the least conservative among common-law countries, due to private debt, lower regulation, and litigation costs. Tax laws, legal restrictions on undistributed earnings, and code-law institutional links between earnings and dividends reduce the timeliness of earnings relative to dividends. Earnings are more timely than cash flows in all countries studied, and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings has increased over time in most countries. The findings have implications for security analysts, accounting standard-setters, regulators, and corporate governance.