This chapter, titled "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," by George J. Stigler, explores the economic theory of law enforcement and the optimal strategies for enforcing laws. Stigler argues that the goal of enforcement is to achieve compliance with prescribed behavior, but enforcement is costly, limiting the extent to which laws can be enforced. He discusses the trade-offs between the costs of enforcement and the benefits of deterring crime, emphasizing that increasing punishment does not always lead to better deterrence due to the marginal nature of decisions and the potential for overenforcement. Stigler also examines the supply of offenses, suggesting that offenses are acts of production or consumption, and that the structure of penalties, detection probabilities, and costs of offending influence the supply of offenses. He proposes a rational enforcement model where expected penalties increase with expected gains, and expenditures on prevention and enforcement should yield a reduction in offenses equal to the return on these resources in other areas. The chapter critiques the current methods of enforcement, noting that enforcement agencies often fail to consider the costs they impose on innocent parties and use inappropriate criteria for determining the extent of enforcement. Stigler suggests that a more rational approach would involve setting enforcement scales based on marginal cost and return, and guiding the selection of cases to focus on frequent violators and those causing significant damage. Finally, Stigler discusses the role of public opinion and policy in shaping enforcement, noting that the public's perception of the seriousness of offenses can influence the resources allocated to enforcement. He concludes by emphasizing the need for a better understanding of rational enforcement to improve public policy and enforcement practices.This chapter, titled "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," by George J. Stigler, explores the economic theory of law enforcement and the optimal strategies for enforcing laws. Stigler argues that the goal of enforcement is to achieve compliance with prescribed behavior, but enforcement is costly, limiting the extent to which laws can be enforced. He discusses the trade-offs between the costs of enforcement and the benefits of deterring crime, emphasizing that increasing punishment does not always lead to better deterrence due to the marginal nature of decisions and the potential for overenforcement. Stigler also examines the supply of offenses, suggesting that offenses are acts of production or consumption, and that the structure of penalties, detection probabilities, and costs of offending influence the supply of offenses. He proposes a rational enforcement model where expected penalties increase with expected gains, and expenditures on prevention and enforcement should yield a reduction in offenses equal to the return on these resources in other areas. The chapter critiques the current methods of enforcement, noting that enforcement agencies often fail to consider the costs they impose on innocent parties and use inappropriate criteria for determining the extent of enforcement. Stigler suggests that a more rational approach would involve setting enforcement scales based on marginal cost and return, and guiding the selection of cases to focus on frequent violators and those causing significant damage. Finally, Stigler discusses the role of public opinion and policy in shaping enforcement, noting that the public's perception of the seriousness of offenses can influence the resources allocated to enforcement. He concludes by emphasizing the need for a better understanding of rational enforcement to improve public policy and enforcement practices.