The article by Andrew Moravcsik examines the origins and evolution of international human rights regimes, focusing on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as a case study. Moravcsik argues that the primary proponents of binding international human rights commitments were not great powers or established democracies, but rather newly established democracies. He attributes this to the self-interest of these governments in "locking in" democratic institutions and reducing future political uncertainty. The ECHR, established in 1950, is seen as a radical development in international law, challenging state sovereignty and liberal ideals of democratic legitimacy. The article critiques realist and ideational theories, which predict that great powers or democratic governments would lead the establishment of such regimes, respectively. Instead, it finds that the ECHR was supported by newly established democracies, while established democracies and transitional regimes opposed it. This pattern supports the republican liberal theory, which views international commitments as a means to reinforce domestic democratic rule. The article concludes by suggesting that the logic of "locking in" credible domestic policies through international commitments can be applied to other human rights regimes and unilateral policies.The article by Andrew Moravcsik examines the origins and evolution of international human rights regimes, focusing on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as a case study. Moravcsik argues that the primary proponents of binding international human rights commitments were not great powers or established democracies, but rather newly established democracies. He attributes this to the self-interest of these governments in "locking in" democratic institutions and reducing future political uncertainty. The ECHR, established in 1950, is seen as a radical development in international law, challenging state sovereignty and liberal ideals of democratic legitimacy. The article critiques realist and ideational theories, which predict that great powers or democratic governments would lead the establishment of such regimes, respectively. Instead, it finds that the ECHR was supported by newly established democracies, while established democracies and transitional regimes opposed it. This pattern supports the republican liberal theory, which views international commitments as a means to reinforce domestic democratic rule. The article concludes by suggesting that the logic of "locking in" credible domestic policies through international commitments can be applied to other human rights regimes and unilateral policies.