The article examines the origins of human rights regimes, particularly focusing on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It challenges traditional realist and ideational explanations for the emergence of such regimes, proposing instead a republican liberal perspective rooted in domestic political self-interest. The author argues that newly established democracies, rather than established democracies or great powers, were the primary proponents of binding international human rights commitments. This is because newly established democracies sought to consolidate democratic institutions and reduce future political uncertainty by enacting international human rights regimes. These regimes, unlike other international institutions, are not primarily concerned with regulating externalities but with holding governments accountable for internal activities. They are also not typically enforced through interstate action but rather through individual claims brought by citizens against their governments. The ECHR, established in 1949, is presented as a prime example of such a regime, with its provisions being widely accepted as the most advanced and effective international human rights regime. The article also highlights the significant impact of the ECHR on European governments, with many incorporating its provisions into domestic law. The author concludes that the emergence of human rights regimes is best explained by the domestic political self-interest of national governments, rather than by realist or ideational factors. This perspective challenges the traditional understanding of international human rights regimes and offers a new framework for analyzing their development.The article examines the origins of human rights regimes, particularly focusing on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It challenges traditional realist and ideational explanations for the emergence of such regimes, proposing instead a republican liberal perspective rooted in domestic political self-interest. The author argues that newly established democracies, rather than established democracies or great powers, were the primary proponents of binding international human rights commitments. This is because newly established democracies sought to consolidate democratic institutions and reduce future political uncertainty by enacting international human rights regimes. These regimes, unlike other international institutions, are not primarily concerned with regulating externalities but with holding governments accountable for internal activities. They are also not typically enforced through interstate action but rather through individual claims brought by citizens against their governments. The ECHR, established in 1949, is presented as a prime example of such a regime, with its provisions being widely accepted as the most advanced and effective international human rights regime. The article also highlights the significant impact of the ECHR on European governments, with many incorporating its provisions into domestic law. The author concludes that the emergence of human rights regimes is best explained by the domestic political self-interest of national governments, rather than by realist or ideational factors. This perspective challenges the traditional understanding of international human rights regimes and offers a new framework for analyzing their development.