The chapter discusses the philosophy of logical atomism, focusing on general propositions and existence. It argues that general propositions, such as "all" or "some," do not inherently involve existence. Instead, they assert the truth of propositional functions, which are expressions containing undetermined constituents. The chapter emphasizes that existence is a property of propositional functions, meaning that a function is true in at least one instance. It also highlights the distinction between logical propositions, which consist solely of variables, and empirical propositions, which can be expressed in logical terms but are not provable from logic. The chapter concludes by discussing the nature of descriptions and incomplete symbols, emphasizing that definite descriptions are not names but complex symbols that can be true or false depending on the existence of the described individual.The chapter discusses the philosophy of logical atomism, focusing on general propositions and existence. It argues that general propositions, such as "all" or "some," do not inherently involve existence. Instead, they assert the truth of propositional functions, which are expressions containing undetermined constituents. The chapter emphasizes that existence is a property of propositional functions, meaning that a function is true in at least one instance. It also highlights the distinction between logical propositions, which consist solely of variables, and empirical propositions, which can be expressed in logical terms but are not provable from logic. The chapter concludes by discussing the nature of descriptions and incomplete symbols, emphasizing that definite descriptions are not names but complex symbols that can be true or false depending on the existence of the described individual.