The article by Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore explores the dynamics and behaviors of international organizations (IOs) beyond their creation and initial intentions. They argue that IOs often deviate from the efficiency goals they were intended to achieve and exhibit autonomous power in ways that are unintended by their creators. The authors develop a constructivist approach rooted in sociological institutionalism to explain both the power of IOs and their tendency towards dysfunctional or pathological behavior. They highlight how the rational-legal authority embodied in IOs gives them power independent of the states that created them, and how this power is channeled in specific directions. The article challenges traditional neoliberal-institutionalist and realist theories by emphasizing the role of bureaucracy in shaping IO behavior. It suggests that the normative valuation of impersonal, generalized rules can lead to unresponsive and self-defeating behavior. The authors provide examples from the UN system to illustrate how IOs create actors, specify responsibilities, and define social purposes, often in ways that are not aligned with state interests. They also discuss the dysfunctional behavior of IOs, which they define as behavior that undermines the organization's stated goals, and argue that this behavior can be traced to the bureaucratic culture within the organization. The article concludes by discussing how their perspective can broaden the research agenda for understanding IOs and their impact on world politics.The article by Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore explores the dynamics and behaviors of international organizations (IOs) beyond their creation and initial intentions. They argue that IOs often deviate from the efficiency goals they were intended to achieve and exhibit autonomous power in ways that are unintended by their creators. The authors develop a constructivist approach rooted in sociological institutionalism to explain both the power of IOs and their tendency towards dysfunctional or pathological behavior. They highlight how the rational-legal authority embodied in IOs gives them power independent of the states that created them, and how this power is channeled in specific directions. The article challenges traditional neoliberal-institutionalist and realist theories by emphasizing the role of bureaucracy in shaping IO behavior. It suggests that the normative valuation of impersonal, generalized rules can lead to unresponsive and self-defeating behavior. The authors provide examples from the UN system to illustrate how IOs create actors, specify responsibilities, and define social purposes, often in ways that are not aligned with state interests. They also discuss the dysfunctional behavior of IOs, which they define as behavior that undermines the organization's stated goals, and argue that this behavior can be traced to the bureaucratic culture within the organization. The article concludes by discussing how their perspective can broaden the research agenda for understanding IOs and their impact on world politics.