Philippa Foot discusses the problem of abortion and the doctrine of the double effect. She argues that the dilemma arises from our conflicting feelings about the rights of the unborn child. We find it absurd to think that the status of a fetus changes so radically in the early stages of life, yet we are reluctant to treat it as a human being. This conflict is compounded by our confusion about what we may and may not do when the interests of human beings conflict. Foot examines the doctrine of the double effect, which distinguishes between what one intends and what one foresees as a result of one's actions. She argues that this doctrine is used by Catholics to justify their views on abortion but is often seen as sophistry by non-Catholics. Foot challenges the doctrine, arguing that it is not a valid basis for moral decisions, and that the distinction between direct and oblique intention is not sufficient to resolve the moral issues involved in abortion. She also presents examples to illustrate the complexities of moral decision-making, such as the case of a driver choosing between saving one person or five, and the case of a judge framing an innocent person to prevent bloodshed. Foot concludes that the distinction between avoiding injury and bringing aid is more important than the distinction between direct and oblique intention in determining moral decisions. She argues that the doctrine of the double effect is not the best way to resolve the moral issues involved in abortion. Anscombe then responds to Foot's argument, suggesting that the idea of saving more people is not necessarily wrong, and that the distinction between direct and oblique intention is not the key to resolving the moral issues involved in abortion. She argues that the decision to save more people is not necessarily wrong, and that the distinction between direct and oblique intention is not the key to resolving the moral issues involved in abortion.Philippa Foot discusses the problem of abortion and the doctrine of the double effect. She argues that the dilemma arises from our conflicting feelings about the rights of the unborn child. We find it absurd to think that the status of a fetus changes so radically in the early stages of life, yet we are reluctant to treat it as a human being. This conflict is compounded by our confusion about what we may and may not do when the interests of human beings conflict. Foot examines the doctrine of the double effect, which distinguishes between what one intends and what one foresees as a result of one's actions. She argues that this doctrine is used by Catholics to justify their views on abortion but is often seen as sophistry by non-Catholics. Foot challenges the doctrine, arguing that it is not a valid basis for moral decisions, and that the distinction between direct and oblique intention is not sufficient to resolve the moral issues involved in abortion. She also presents examples to illustrate the complexities of moral decision-making, such as the case of a driver choosing between saving one person or five, and the case of a judge framing an innocent person to prevent bloodshed. Foot concludes that the distinction between avoiding injury and bringing aid is more important than the distinction between direct and oblique intention in determining moral decisions. She argues that the doctrine of the double effect is not the best way to resolve the moral issues involved in abortion. Anscombe then responds to Foot's argument, suggesting that the idea of saving more people is not necessarily wrong, and that the distinction between direct and oblique intention is not the key to resolving the moral issues involved in abortion. She argues that the decision to save more people is not necessarily wrong, and that the distinction between direct and oblique intention is not the key to resolving the moral issues involved in abortion.