The study examines the quality of accounting information in firms with political connections, finding that these firms report significantly poorer earnings quality compared to non-connected firms. Among connected firms, those with stronger political ties exhibit the poorest accruals quality. The authors suggest that managers of connected firms may be less sensitive to market pressures to improve information quality, possibly due to the perceived protection from politicians. The evidence indicates that lower-quality reported earnings are associated with higher costs of debt only for non-politically connected firms, suggesting that political connections mitigate the negative consequences of poor information quality. The study uses a large firm-level dataset on corporate political connections and constructs a measure of accounting earnings quality based on the variability of discretionary accruals. The results are robust to various robustness tests and alternative measures of earnings quality.The study examines the quality of accounting information in firms with political connections, finding that these firms report significantly poorer earnings quality compared to non-connected firms. Among connected firms, those with stronger political ties exhibit the poorest accruals quality. The authors suggest that managers of connected firms may be less sensitive to market pressures to improve information quality, possibly due to the perceived protection from politicians. The evidence indicates that lower-quality reported earnings are associated with higher costs of debt only for non-politically connected firms, suggesting that political connections mitigate the negative consequences of poor information quality. The study uses a large firm-level dataset on corporate political connections and constructs a measure of accounting earnings quality based on the variability of discretionary accruals. The results are robust to various robustness tests and alternative measures of earnings quality.