This study examines the quality of accounting information in politically connected firms. It finds that politically connected firms report significantly lower quality earnings compared to non-connected firms. Additionally, firms with stronger political ties exhibit poorer accruals quality. The results suggest that managers of politically connected firms are less sensitive to market pressures to improve information quality. This is justified because lower quality earnings are associated with higher debt costs only for non-politically connected firms. The study uses data from Faccio (2006) on corporate political connections and accounting data from Worldscope to measure earnings quality based on the variability of discretionary accruals. It finds that political connections are a more significant predictor of accounting quality than country-level variables such as corruption, legal system quality, and shareholder rights. The study also addresses endogeneity concerns and finds that political connections are robustly associated with lower earnings quality. However, connected firms do not face the same negative consequences of poor earnings quality as non-connected firms, possibly due to political pressures and protection from lenders. The study concludes that politically connected firms have systematically lower quality accounting information than non-connected firms. This is supported by robustness tests using alternative measures of earnings quality and different estimation methods. The findings suggest that political connections may lead to lower quality earnings due to reduced market pressures and potential protection from lenders.This study examines the quality of accounting information in politically connected firms. It finds that politically connected firms report significantly lower quality earnings compared to non-connected firms. Additionally, firms with stronger political ties exhibit poorer accruals quality. The results suggest that managers of politically connected firms are less sensitive to market pressures to improve information quality. This is justified because lower quality earnings are associated with higher debt costs only for non-politically connected firms. The study uses data from Faccio (2006) on corporate political connections and accounting data from Worldscope to measure earnings quality based on the variability of discretionary accruals. It finds that political connections are a more significant predictor of accounting quality than country-level variables such as corruption, legal system quality, and shareholder rights. The study also addresses endogeneity concerns and finds that political connections are robustly associated with lower earnings quality. However, connected firms do not face the same negative consequences of poor earnings quality as non-connected firms, possibly due to political pressures and protection from lenders. The study concludes that politically connected firms have systematically lower quality accounting information than non-connected firms. This is supported by robustness tests using alternative measures of earnings quality and different estimation methods. The findings suggest that political connections may lead to lower quality earnings due to reduced market pressures and potential protection from lenders.