The paper by P. Naor, titled "On the Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls," explores the strategic imposition of tolls on customers joining a queue to optimize social welfare. The study is motivated by the analogy with traffic congestion control, where individual routing decisions do not necessarily optimize the overall system. The key assumptions include the existence of a public good and the possibility of diverting customers from the service station. The model assumes a stationary Poisson stream of customers, exponentially distributed service times, and equal rewards and costs for customers. The analysis focuses on two strategies: self-interest (self-optimization) and overall optimization (maximizing the expected sum of net gains). The paper demonstrates that self-interest often leads to suboptimal outcomes, while overall optimization can be achieved through appropriate tolls. The optimal toll range is derived to maximize combined customer and revenue agency income, and the paper concludes that toll collection can be beneficial if the objective function represents a public good. However, if the toll-collecting agency aims to maximize its revenue, the tolls may be too high, leading to suboptimal social outcomes. The results are robust to model specifics, such as service time distributions and reward structures.The paper by P. Naor, titled "On the Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls," explores the strategic imposition of tolls on customers joining a queue to optimize social welfare. The study is motivated by the analogy with traffic congestion control, where individual routing decisions do not necessarily optimize the overall system. The key assumptions include the existence of a public good and the possibility of diverting customers from the service station. The model assumes a stationary Poisson stream of customers, exponentially distributed service times, and equal rewards and costs for customers. The analysis focuses on two strategies: self-interest (self-optimization) and overall optimization (maximizing the expected sum of net gains). The paper demonstrates that self-interest often leads to suboptimal outcomes, while overall optimization can be achieved through appropriate tolls. The optimal toll range is derived to maximize combined customer and revenue agency income, and the paper concludes that toll collection can be beneficial if the objective function represents a public good. However, if the toll-collecting agency aims to maximize its revenue, the tolls may be too high, leading to suboptimal social outcomes. The results are robust to model specifics, such as service time distributions and reward structures.