The paper by Oxley and Sampson explores the challenges faced by participants in research and development (R&D) alliances, particularly the balance between open knowledge exchange and controlling knowledge flows to prevent valuable technology leakage. While prior research suggests that choosing an appropriate governance structure is crucial, the authors propose an alternative approach: reducing the scope of the alliance. They argue that when partner firms are direct competitors in end product or strategic resource markets, even protective governance structures like equity joint ventures may not sufficient to encourage extensive knowledge sharing. Instead, partners limit the scope of activities to those that can be completed with limited and regulated knowledge sharing. The study uses empirical analysis of international R&D alliances involving electronics and telecommunications equipment companies to support these arguments. The results indicate that partners are more likely to limit activities to pure R&D when they are direct competitors in final product and geographic markets, especially when adding marketing activities. The scope of alliance activities is also influenced by the relative absorptive capacity of partner firms, with higher overlap in technological assets predicting a narrower scope. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for the protection of technological assets and the role of alliance scope and governance in R&D alliances.The paper by Oxley and Sampson explores the challenges faced by participants in research and development (R&D) alliances, particularly the balance between open knowledge exchange and controlling knowledge flows to prevent valuable technology leakage. While prior research suggests that choosing an appropriate governance structure is crucial, the authors propose an alternative approach: reducing the scope of the alliance. They argue that when partner firms are direct competitors in end product or strategic resource markets, even protective governance structures like equity joint ventures may not sufficient to encourage extensive knowledge sharing. Instead, partners limit the scope of activities to those that can be completed with limited and regulated knowledge sharing. The study uses empirical analysis of international R&D alliances involving electronics and telecommunications equipment companies to support these arguments. The results indicate that partners are more likely to limit activities to pure R&D when they are direct competitors in final product and geographic markets, especially when adding marketing activities. The scope of alliance activities is also influenced by the relative absorptive capacity of partner firms, with higher overlap in technological assets predicting a narrower scope. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for the protection of technological assets and the role of alliance scope and governance in R&D alliances.