This paper examines the relationship between disputes that are litigated and those that are settled, focusing on how the selection of disputes for litigation affects the analysis of the legal system and its influence on society. The authors argue that the disputes that reach trial and appeal do not represent a random or representative sample of all disputes, but rather are influenced by economic factors such as the expected costs of litigation and settlement, the information available to the parties, and the direct costs of litigation and settlement. The authors propose a model of the litigation process that shows that the disputes selected for litigation will not be a random or representative sample of all disputes. This is because the parties' expectations of the outcome of a dispute are influenced by their estimates of the likelihood of success, which are based on their available information and their beliefs about how the court will interpret the facts. These estimates are subject to error, and the parties' expectations of the outcome are therefore not necessarily accurate. The model shows that the disputes selected for litigation will be those where the parties' estimates of the outcome are most uncertain. This is because the parties are more likely to litigate disputes where they are less certain of the outcome, as they are more likely to be willing to take the risk of litigation. The model also shows that the rate of plaintiff victories in litigation will tend toward 50 percent regardless of the legal standard, as the parties' estimates of the outcome are subject to error. The authors also show that the selection process is influenced by the stakes involved in the dispute. Disputes where the stakes are higher are more likely to be litigated, as the parties are more willing to take the risk of litigation. The model also shows that the selection process is influenced by the parties' error in estimating the outcome of the dispute. The more accurate the parties' estimates of the outcome, the less likely they are to litigate, as they are more confident in the outcome. The authors conclude that the selection of disputes for litigation is a complex process influenced by a variety of factors, including the economic costs of litigation and settlement, the information available to the parties, and the direct costs of litigation and settlement. The model shows that the disputes selected for litigation are not a random or representative sample of all disputes, but rather are influenced by the parties' expectations of the outcome and their willingness to take the risk of litigation. The model also shows that the rate of plaintiff victories in litigation will tend toward 50 percent regardless of the legal standard, as the parties' estimates of the outcome are subject to error.This paper examines the relationship between disputes that are litigated and those that are settled, focusing on how the selection of disputes for litigation affects the analysis of the legal system and its influence on society. The authors argue that the disputes that reach trial and appeal do not represent a random or representative sample of all disputes, but rather are influenced by economic factors such as the expected costs of litigation and settlement, the information available to the parties, and the direct costs of litigation and settlement. The authors propose a model of the litigation process that shows that the disputes selected for litigation will not be a random or representative sample of all disputes. This is because the parties' expectations of the outcome of a dispute are influenced by their estimates of the likelihood of success, which are based on their available information and their beliefs about how the court will interpret the facts. These estimates are subject to error, and the parties' expectations of the outcome are therefore not necessarily accurate. The model shows that the disputes selected for litigation will be those where the parties' estimates of the outcome are most uncertain. This is because the parties are more likely to litigate disputes where they are less certain of the outcome, as they are more likely to be willing to take the risk of litigation. The model also shows that the rate of plaintiff victories in litigation will tend toward 50 percent regardless of the legal standard, as the parties' estimates of the outcome are subject to error. The authors also show that the selection process is influenced by the stakes involved in the dispute. Disputes where the stakes are higher are more likely to be litigated, as the parties are more willing to take the risk of litigation. The model also shows that the selection process is influenced by the parties' error in estimating the outcome of the dispute. The more accurate the parties' estimates of the outcome, the less likely they are to litigate, as they are more confident in the outcome. The authors conclude that the selection of disputes for litigation is a complex process influenced by a variety of factors, including the economic costs of litigation and settlement, the information available to the parties, and the direct costs of litigation and settlement. The model shows that the disputes selected for litigation are not a random or representative sample of all disputes, but rather are influenced by the parties' expectations of the outcome and their willingness to take the risk of litigation. The model also shows that the rate of plaintiff victories in litigation will tend toward 50 percent regardless of the legal standard, as the parties' estimates of the outcome are subject to error.