The article "The Swing Voter's Curse" by Timothy J. Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer analyzes two-candidate elections where some voters are uncertain about a state variable affecting their utility. The authors demonstrate the existence of a "swing voter's curse," where less informed voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate, even when voting is cost-free. This leads to a significant fraction of the electorate abstaining, despite all abstainers strictly preferring to vote for one candidate over the other. The model formalizes and extends an example where uninformed voters have an incentive to delegate their votes to more informed voters. The authors show that in large elections, a substantial fraction of voters abstain, and the winning candidate is likely to be the same as if voters were fully informed. The results have implications for understanding voter participation and election outcomes, particularly in the context of asymmetric information.The article "The Swing Voter's Curse" by Timothy J. Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer analyzes two-candidate elections where some voters are uncertain about a state variable affecting their utility. The authors demonstrate the existence of a "swing voter's curse," where less informed voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate, even when voting is cost-free. This leads to a significant fraction of the electorate abstaining, despite all abstainers strictly preferring to vote for one candidate over the other. The model formalizes and extends an example where uninformed voters have an incentive to delegate their votes to more informed voters. The authors show that in large elections, a substantial fraction of voters abstain, and the winning candidate is likely to be the same as if voters were fully informed. The results have implications for understanding voter participation and election outcomes, particularly in the context of asymmetric information.