This paper re-examines the inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit, proposing that this relationship is due to people relying on affect when judging specific hazards. Two experimental studies support this hypothesis. Study 1 investigates the inverse relationship under time pressure, which limits analytic thought and enhances reliance on affect. Study 2 tests the hypothesis that altering the overall affective evaluation of an item systematically changes risk and benefit judgments. Both studies suggest that people use an "affect heuristic," deriving risk and benefit evaluations from a common source—emotional reactions to the stimulus item. The findings highlight the importance of considering affect in judgment processes and provide a partial explanation for the inverse relationship between risk and benefit judgments.This paper re-examines the inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit, proposing that this relationship is due to people relying on affect when judging specific hazards. Two experimental studies support this hypothesis. Study 1 investigates the inverse relationship under time pressure, which limits analytic thought and enhances reliance on affect. Study 2 tests the hypothesis that altering the overall affective evaluation of an item systematically changes risk and benefit judgments. Both studies suggest that people use an "affect heuristic," deriving risk and benefit evaluations from a common source—emotional reactions to the stimulus item. The findings highlight the importance of considering affect in judgment processes and provide a partial explanation for the inverse relationship between risk and benefit judgments.