Author:James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock
Pages:20
Summary:"The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy" is a seminal work by James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, published in 1962. The book, edited and introduced by Charles K. Rowley, explores the logical foundations of constitutional democracy, focusing on the principles of methodological individualism and rational choice theory. It challenges conventional wisdom in economics and political science, particularly the notion that politics is primarily a conflict-ridden, negative-sum game.
The book is divided into four parts. Part I establishes the conceptual framework, emphasizing individual rationality and the universal consensus as the basis for collective action. Part II defines the realm of social choice, using an externalities-based theory to explain why individuals adopt political constitutions. Part III applies the logic developed in Part II to analyze various decision-making rules, including simple majority voting and the rule of unanimity. Part IV turns to the economics and ethics of democracy, discussing the role of pressure groups and the politics of the good society.
The authors argue that individuals seek to minimize expected costs when choosing among alternative voting rules, with the rule of unanimity occupying a central place in any normative theory of democratic government. They challenge the prevailing consensus that majority rule is the best decision-making rule, showing that it can lead to overinvestment in the public sector and that only with side payments can majority-rule decision-making lead to Pareto optimality.
The book's interdisciplinary approach, combining economics and political science, has had a profound impact on both fields, leading to the development of new subfields such as public choice and constitutional political economy.