Peter Carruthers discusses the argument that conscious will is an illusion, as presented by Wegner (2002). Carruthers surveys Wegner's arguments, finding some unconvincing but highlighting a promising argument based on the ubiquity of self-interpretation. However, this argument is challenged by dual process theories of reasoning and decision-making. Carruthers proposes a priori considerations about the causal role of a will to address this challenge. He argues that conscious will is indeed an illusion, as conscious events, such as intentions and decisions, often do not directly cause actions but are mediated by unconscious processes. The illusion arises from a simplified model of self-awareness in the mind-reading system, which fails to account for the complex causal chains involved in decision-making. Despite some attempts to defend the reality of conscious will, Carruthers concludes that the illusion persists due to the limitations of the mind-reading system's model.Peter Carruthers discusses the argument that conscious will is an illusion, as presented by Wegner (2002). Carruthers surveys Wegner's arguments, finding some unconvincing but highlighting a promising argument based on the ubiquity of self-interpretation. However, this argument is challenged by dual process theories of reasoning and decision-making. Carruthers proposes a priori considerations about the causal role of a will to address this challenge. He argues that conscious will is indeed an illusion, as conscious events, such as intentions and decisions, often do not directly cause actions but are mediated by unconscious processes. The illusion arises from a simplified model of self-awareness in the mind-reading system, which fails to account for the complex causal chains involved in decision-making. Despite some attempts to defend the reality of conscious will, Carruthers concludes that the illusion persists due to the limitations of the mind-reading system's model.