Peter Carruthers argues that conscious will is an illusion, challenging Wegner's claim that our ability to consciously decide or intend is not real. Carruthers acknowledges that Wegner presents various arguments against conscious will, including the idea that we lack direct awareness of the causal relationship between our conscious decisions and actions. However, Carruthers contends that Wegner's argument is flawed because it overlooks the role of conscious will in causing actions, even if we are not directly aware of the causal relationship. Carruthers also argues that the idea of conscious will is not necessarily illusory if the causal role of conscious decisions is sufficient to constitute a will. Furthermore, Carruthers challenges Wegner's claim that our access to our own will is always interpretative, arguing that this is not necessarily the case. Carruthers also discusses the role of two systems theory in reasoning and decision-making, suggesting that conscious will can be real if it is associated with System 2 processes. Carruthers concludes that conscious will is an illusion because our access to our own will is always interpretative, and that the causal role of conscious decisions is not sufficient to constitute a genuine will. The illusion of conscious will arises because our mind-reading system has a limited and simplified model of our own mental operations, leading us to believe that our decisions are conscious when they are not.Peter Carruthers argues that conscious will is an illusion, challenging Wegner's claim that our ability to consciously decide or intend is not real. Carruthers acknowledges that Wegner presents various arguments against conscious will, including the idea that we lack direct awareness of the causal relationship between our conscious decisions and actions. However, Carruthers contends that Wegner's argument is flawed because it overlooks the role of conscious will in causing actions, even if we are not directly aware of the causal relationship. Carruthers also argues that the idea of conscious will is not necessarily illusory if the causal role of conscious decisions is sufficient to constitute a will. Furthermore, Carruthers challenges Wegner's claim that our access to our own will is always interpretative, arguing that this is not necessarily the case. Carruthers also discusses the role of two systems theory in reasoning and decision-making, suggesting that conscious will can be real if it is associated with System 2 processes. Carruthers concludes that conscious will is an illusion because our access to our own will is always interpretative, and that the causal role of conscious decisions is not sufficient to constitute a genuine will. The illusion of conscious will arises because our mind-reading system has a limited and simplified model of our own mental operations, leading us to believe that our decisions are conscious when they are not.