this book explores the possibility of cooperation in the provision of public and other non-excludable goods, focusing on game theory and collective action. it begins with an introduction to the problem of collective action, including the prisoners' dilemma, chicken game, and other relevant concepts. the book then delves into the prisoners' dilemma, chicken game, and other games in the provision of public goods, discussing alternatives to the prisoners' dilemma, mutual aid, fisheries, and voting in committees. it also examines pre-commitment as a risky decision and the prospects for cooperation in chicken games, as well as continuous strategy sets and cournot analysis. the book continues with the two-person prisoners' dilemma supergame, discussing unconditional cooperation and defection, the possibility of conditional cooperation, assurance games, and coordination equilibria. it also explores other mutual cooperation equilibria and the outcomes of cooperation. the n-person prisoners' dilemma supergame is then analyzed, including payoffs in the constituent game, unconditional cooperation and defection, conditional cooperation, subgroups of cooperators, and other cooperative equilibria. an example is provided, along with an analysis of alternation between blocks of conditional cooperators. the book also discusses altruism and superiority, including altruism in two-person games and an n-person game of difference. it examines the state, comparing hobbes's and hume's leviathans. the epilogue reflects on cooperation, the state, and anarchy, discussing international anarchy, the destruction of community, the decay of voluntary cooperation, and rationality. the book concludes with an annex on the theory of metagames, notes, bibliography, and index.this book explores the possibility of cooperation in the provision of public and other non-excludable goods, focusing on game theory and collective action. it begins with an introduction to the problem of collective action, including the prisoners' dilemma, chicken game, and other relevant concepts. the book then delves into the prisoners' dilemma, chicken game, and other games in the provision of public goods, discussing alternatives to the prisoners' dilemma, mutual aid, fisheries, and voting in committees. it also examines pre-commitment as a risky decision and the prospects for cooperation in chicken games, as well as continuous strategy sets and cournot analysis. the book continues with the two-person prisoners' dilemma supergame, discussing unconditional cooperation and defection, the possibility of conditional cooperation, assurance games, and coordination equilibria. it also explores other mutual cooperation equilibria and the outcomes of cooperation. the n-person prisoners' dilemma supergame is then analyzed, including payoffs in the constituent game, unconditional cooperation and defection, conditional cooperation, subgroups of cooperators, and other cooperative equilibria. an example is provided, along with an analysis of alternation between blocks of conditional cooperators. the book also discusses altruism and superiority, including altruism in two-person games and an n-person game of difference. it examines the state, comparing hobbes's and hume's leviathans. the epilogue reflects on cooperation, the state, and anarchy, discussing international anarchy, the destruction of community, the decay of voluntary cooperation, and rationality. the book concludes with an annex on the theory of metagames, notes, bibliography, and index.