The paper by J. Maynard Smith discusses the evolution of animal conflict behaviors using game theory. It extends previous work by Maynard Smith & Price (1973), showing that ritualized behavior can evolve through individual selection. The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is introduced, which is a strategy that, if adopted by a population, cannot be displaced by any alternative strategy. Two types of ritualized contests are distinguished: "tournaments" and "displays." Tournaments involve physical contact and result in victory based on strength, while displays involve no physical contact and victory is determined by the contestant who persists longer. The paper concludes that the duration of persistence in displays should vary, individuals should display with constant intensity, and initial asymmetries in contest conditions can resolve conflicts even if they are irrelevant to longer conflicts. The paper also explores the application of game theory to animal contests, emphasizing the importance of evolutionary stable strategies. It discusses the challenges of applying game theory to human conflicts, where utilities are difficult to quantify, but in animal behavior, outcomes can be measured in terms of reproductive success. The paper presents a simple model of contests where the winner is the contestant who persists longer, showing that a mixed strategy can be an ESS. It further examines the role of asymmetry in contests, demonstrating that initial asymmetries can lead to stable strategies, even if they do not affect the probability of winning. The paper concludes that evolutionary stable strategies can explain the evolution of animal conflict behaviors, including the use of displays and the resolution of contests through initial asymmetries.The paper by J. Maynard Smith discusses the evolution of animal conflict behaviors using game theory. It extends previous work by Maynard Smith & Price (1973), showing that ritualized behavior can evolve through individual selection. The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is introduced, which is a strategy that, if adopted by a population, cannot be displaced by any alternative strategy. Two types of ritualized contests are distinguished: "tournaments" and "displays." Tournaments involve physical contact and result in victory based on strength, while displays involve no physical contact and victory is determined by the contestant who persists longer. The paper concludes that the duration of persistence in displays should vary, individuals should display with constant intensity, and initial asymmetries in contest conditions can resolve conflicts even if they are irrelevant to longer conflicts. The paper also explores the application of game theory to animal contests, emphasizing the importance of evolutionary stable strategies. It discusses the challenges of applying game theory to human conflicts, where utilities are difficult to quantify, but in animal behavior, outcomes can be measured in terms of reproductive success. The paper presents a simple model of contests where the winner is the contestant who persists longer, showing that a mixed strategy can be an ESS. It further examines the role of asymmetry in contests, demonstrating that initial asymmetries can lead to stable strategies, even if they do not affect the probability of winning. The paper concludes that evolutionary stable strategies can explain the evolution of animal conflict behaviors, including the use of displays and the resolution of contests through initial asymmetries.